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An asset pricing anomaly is a statistically significant difference between the 
realized average returns associated with certain characteristics of  securities, or on 
portfolios of  securities formed on the basis of  those characteristics, and the returns 
that are predicted by a particular asset pricing model (Brennan and Xia, 2001). The 
“value anomaly” refers to the tendency of  value stocks outperforming growth stocks 
(e.g., Rosenberg et al., 1984; Fama and French, 1992, 1996). The concept of  “value 
stocks” is generally defined as stocks that have low prices relative to book equity, 
earnings, dividends, or other measures of  fundamental value (Fama and French 1992, 
1993, 1996; Lakonishok et al., 1994). These stocks also have persistently low earnings, 
higher financial leverage, more earnings uncertainty, and are more likely to cut 
dividend in the future (Fama and French, 1995, Chen and Zhang, 1998). In contrast, 
“growth stocks” refer to stocks that have the opposite characteristics.  
The superior performance of  value stocks has been found in US stock market as 
well as other countries such as Japan (Chan, Hamao and Lakonishok, 1991) and 
France, Germany, Switzerland, and the UK (Capaul, Rowley and Sharpe, 1993). It is 
also observed to be robust against data snooping and selection bias (Chan, Jegadeesh 
and Lakonishok, 1995; Davis, 1994). In addition to academic acknowledgement of  
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value stock anomaly, the investment industry is also aware of  this phenomenon. The 
investment strategy which emphasizes on value stocks is known contrarian 
investment or value strategy.  
Superior returns associated with value strategy is an anomaly counter to the 
efficient market hypothesis,1 which prescribes that stocks are priced efficiently and 
exhibit a random walk. Essentially, if  stock returns exhibit any predictable pattern, 
investors will take advantage of  the price movements to earn abnormal returns. 
REIT stocks are historical regarded more as value stocks than growth stocks, 
because of  their high dividend-payout requirement and their similar return 
performance style with value stocks (Chan, Erickson, and Wang, 2003; Chiang and 
Lee, 2002). However, after the Tax Reform Act of  1986, REIT market has 
experienced structural changes. While most pre-1990 REITs are externally advised, 
with less growth potential, REITs in recent years are more actively managed and 
under increasing pressure to pursue growth. Essentially, having a high growth rate in 
earnings results in a higher valuation, which in turn enable them to consolidate more 
easily with REITs that have lower valuations (Downs, 1998). Also, cross-sectionally, 
there is a wide variation in the B/M (book-to-market value) ratio, earnings and 
dividend growth of  individual REITs as will be demonstrated in the later chapters. 
Hence, REITs cannot be stereotyped as “value” stocks.  
                                                        
1  Fama (1990) defines a weakly efficient market as all past price information has been 
reflected in current stock price; a semi-strong efficient market that all public information has 
been reflected in current market price; and a strong efficient market that all inside and public 
information has been reflected in current stock price.  
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1.2 Motivation of  Study 
It is well documented that REITs in the 1990s experienced significant changes 
and many researchers have raised interesting questions upon whether returns of  
recent REIT stocks behave more in line with common stocks. Specifically, studies on 
stocks return anomalies such as underpricing of  IPO, short-run momentum, and 
Monday stock anomaly all found that REITs in 1990s perform more like other 
operating firms traded in the stock market, while REITs before 1990s have a 
different pattern with common stocks (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997; Chui, Titman, and 
Wei, 2003; Chan, Leung, and Wang, 2005). However, there have been few studies that 
examine the value anomaly in REIT returns. Since value anomaly is an important 
pattern in stock returns, it is important to examine whether the anomaly exists in the 
REIT market. 
Essentially, understanding the return pattern of  value and growth REIT stocks is 
important because value strategy generally involves long-term holding periods (up 
five years). Furthermore, previous studies on anomalies of  REIT returns have mostly 
drawn evidence from a short- or media-term perspective (using daily, weekly, monthly 
and quarterly holding period returns), while long-term (holding period longer than 
one year) return behavior of  REITs is mostly ignored. Examining the value anomaly 
in REIT returns over long-term holding periods will therefore contribute to the 
knowledge gap.  
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This study is also motivated by the changes in REITs during 1990s. While 
pre-1990 REITs are regarded as passive investment vehicle with little growth 
potential, post-1990 REITs become more actively managed with higher growth 
potential. Meanwhile, there is more uncertainty in the valuation of  REITs after 1990, 
both because investors have to consider the value of  ‘growth options’ from REIT 
expansion (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997). In addition, the earnings of  REIT have also 
become more volatile (Chui, Titman, and Wei, 2003). The REIT market provides a 
good setting to test two possible explanations for the existence of  value anomaly. 
Specifically, Chen and Zhang (1998) propose that value anomaly would be 
insignificant in high-growth market because value stocks may not be much riskier 
than growth stocks in a robust expansion market. On the other hand, Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001) predict that value anomaly would be more 
prominent in a market with higher valuation uncertainty, as the mispricing in such 
market is more severe.  
There are several advantages to study REITs as a separate sample. First, unlike 
other industries that are sometimes difficult to identify, REIT stocks are more easily 
defined, thus we can efficiently control the industry effect on return behavior.2 
Controlling the industry effect is critical to arbitrageurs in the real world. By 
simultaneously buying and selling similar instruments, arbitrageurs protect themselves 
against price changes due to common factors (Harris, 2003).  
                                                        
2 Kothari, Shanken, and Sloan (1995) find a significant relationship between industry B/M and 
industry stock returns. 
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Second, book-to-market ratio could be a better proxy for growth expectation in 
REITs. Corporate finance literatures have interpreted the book-to-market ratio as a 
measure of  risk, growth opportunities, or reflect different amounts of  intangible 
assets.3  For REITs, since the intangible assets contribute very little to their values, if  
there is any relationship between B/M and REITs returns, it is more reliably to 
capture either the differences in risk or growth expectations. Thus, REITs provide a 
more efficient context to test the value anomaly from risk-based theory and 
extrapolation theory. 
 
1.3 Research Objectives  
The main purpose of  this work is to investigate the significance of  value 
anomaly in REIT returns over different time periods. Furthermore, this study 
empirically tests the risk-based explanation and behavioral explanations for value 
anomaly. Finally, we examine the role of  arbitrage costs in the existence of  value 
anomaly.  
The four research questions addressed in this study are: 
1. Is there significant value anomaly within REIT market, during pre-1990, post-1990, 
                                                        
3 For an excellent discussion of  these interpretation for book-to-market ratio, see Hirshleifer 
(2001) and also Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (2001).  
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or both periods?  Answering this question would provide evidence towards the 
predictions related to expanding market (Chen and Zhang, 1998) and valuation 
uncertainty (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 2001). It would also compare 
the results from REIT market and common stock market.  
2. Do value REIT stocks expose investors to higher systematic risk? Particularly, 
Fama and French (1993, 1996) suggest that abnormal return of  value strategy 
would become insignificant when additional risk factors (SMB and HML) are 
incorporated into the single factor model. 
In addition, is spread of  risk between value and growth REIT stocks becomes 
small during post-1990s period, as suggested by Chen and Zhang (1998)?  
3. Do investors make expectational errors in future growth of  value and growth 
REIT stocks? Lakonishok et al. (1994) suggest that value stock premium is caused 
by investors naively extrapolating firms’ past performance into the future. 
Following studies confirmed this argument and provide further evidence in market 
reactions to future earnings announcements of  value and growth stocks.  
4. Is there a significant relationship between arbitrage costs and value anomaly in 
REITs returns? Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and others suggest that idiosyncratic 
risk associated with value premium is the most important factor for the persistence 




1.4 Review of  Methodology 
This study uses book-to-market ratio (B/M) as the criteria for value and growth 
stocks. To answer the first research question, we first place REITs in our sample into 
different portfolios of  value and growth stocks based on their B/M, and their returns 
are analyzed over specified holding periods (one- to three-years), to see whether the 
value anomaly is significant. The premium of  value stock in REIT market is also 
compared with that in common stocks to test whether the value anomaly is less 
prominent in post-1990s period, as predicated by Chen and Zhang (1998).  
To answer the second research question, we examine the risk-based theory by 
testing the risks of  these value and growth portfolios. Several conventional risk 
measurements are used, such as standard deviation, beta, Sharpe Ratio, Treynor Ratio, 
Coefficient of  Variation, as well as factor loadings on Fama French (1993)’s 
three-factor. The HML factor in the three-factor model is suggested to well capture 
the distress risk of  value stocks. Therefore, value stocks would show a high loading 
on this factor for the risk-based theory to hold. Besides, risks associated with 
macroeconomic factors and NAREIT returns, which have been identified in real 
estate literatures, are also analyzed as a complementary to the risk-based explanation.  
As for the third research question, the extrapolation model of  Lakonishok et al. 
(1994) is tested to see whether value anomaly is caused by investors naively 
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extrapolating past performance into future. We specifically employ the past-, future-, 
and expected- growth rate of  dividend and funds from operation (FFO), and test 
whether investors make expectational errors in the future growth rates of  value and 
growth stocks. In addition, event study methodology is applied to analyze whether 
the market reaction to the earnings announcements (day -1 to +1 around 
announcement date) is more positive to value stocks than growth stocks. As investors 
realized the expectational errors and try to correct it when new information about 
the performance comes.  
Finally, for the fourth research question, this study examines the idiosyncratic 
risk of  value and growth stocks. In addition, a model incorporating the arbitrage cost 
measures and their interaction with B/M ratio is applied to see whether value 
anomaly is associated with these arbitrage costs that deter the activity of  arbitrageurs.  
 
1.5 Scope of  the Study 
Focusing on the U.S. REIT market, our sample consists of  all REITs (including 
equity, mortgage and hybrid) that are traded on NYSE, AMEX and NASDAQ over 
the period from 1982 to 2003. All REITs (equity, mortgage, and hybrid REITs) are 
included to make a bigger sample for portfolio construction, especially for the 
pre-1990 period, when the sample size is small. Excluding those mortgage and hybrid 
REITs from our sample does not change the results significantly, as those REITs 
tend to distribute symmetrically in value and growth stocks.  
  9
 
Our sample period covers the fundamental change in the REIT market occurred 
in early 1990s. We divide our sample period into two subperiods (pre-1990 period 
and post-1990 period), and examine the value anomaly in the whole period and these 
two subperiods separately. Along with the large increased number of  REITs, there 
were major changes in the REIT industry, which included changes in the strategies, 
organization and growth opportunities of  the trusts. Changes of  REITs in these two 
subperiods provide a particular good setting for evaluating the mispricing against risk 
explanation for value stock anomalies. 
 
1.6 Findings and Contribution of  This Study 
First, this study explicitly examines the value anomaly in REIT returns, and finds 
significant evidence of  value anomaly in REIT market. However, the value anomaly 
only exists in post-1990 period, while no evidence is found in pre-1990 period.  
Second, we find that value REIT stocks do not expose investors to greater risks 
over a holding period of  36 month. In contrast we find that value REITs stocks are 
undervalued by investors, which causes their higher returns. In addition, there is high 
idiosyncratic risk associated with the superior returns of  value REIT stocks. Thus, 
the value premium would persist for a long time. While growth REIT stocks are less 
overpriced, or they are more correctly priced by the investors, therefore, growth 
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REIT stocks do not exhibit much lower returns.  
Third, the mispricing of  REIT during 1990s is mainly due to the higher 
valuation uncertainty in this time period. As there is less valuation uncertainty in 
pre-1990 period, the pricing of  REITs is straightforward.  
 
1.7 Organization 
The remaining of  the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter two reviews 
literatures and provides the main research hypothesis for this study. Chapter three 
describes the detailed hypotheses that would be tested as well as methodology and 
data set that will be adopted in this study. Chapter four and five present the empirical 
results of  the value anomaly in REIT market and examine whether it compensates 
for risks identified by previous studies. Chapter six focuses on the extrapolation 
model and examine expectational errors in different periods. Chapter seven further 
tests the effect of  arbitrage costs in the existence of  value anomaly. Chapter eight 
concludes with a summary of  the major findings and implications, as well as 








This chapter provides an overview of  the studies on the pricing and return 
behavior of  common stocks as well as REIT stock. A brief  review of  the 
development of  REIT market is also presented. Section 2.2 reviews the theoretical 
background for the asset pricing models. Section 2.3 introduces previous empirical 
evidence of  value anomalies. Section 2.4 and section 2.5 explore alternative 
explanations for the value stock anomaly, namely risk-based theory and behavioral 
theory. Section 2.6 reviews the development of  REIT market, including significant 
changes in the market structure and explosive growth condition. Section 2.7 discusses 
studies on the pricing and return behavior of  REIT stocks. Section 2.8 summarizes 
the findings of  previous studies. 
 
2.2 Finance Literature 
2.2.1 Asset Pricing Models: Theoretical Background 
Capital market theory presumes that all assets should possess similar 
risk-adjusted returns in equilibrium. Two alternative asset pricing models are 
associated with capital market theory, namely CAPM and APT. 
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The capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of  Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), 
and Mossin (1966) describes the expected return on an asset as a function of  its 
covariation with return on the market portfolio, which is known as systematic risk. 
Investors are only compensated for bearing systematic risk in a CAPM world, since 
nonsystematic risk is diversifiable. Every asset in CAPM equilibrium is priced so that 
its risk-adjusted return falls exactly on the security market line.  
While the CAPM is a simple model that is based on sound reasoning, some of  the 
assumptions that underlie the model are unrealistic. For example, all investors are 
assumed to have the same information, without information cost. In addition, there 
are no transaction costs, and investors can readily borrow funds at the risk free rate 
of  interest. Finally, it assumes a mean-variance efficient market portfolio. Some 
extensions of  the basic CAPM were proposed that relaxed one or more of  these 
assumptions (e.g., Black, 1972). Instead of  simply extending an existing theory, Ross 
(1976a, 1976b) addresses this concern by developing a completely different model: 
the Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT). Unlike the CAPM, which is a model of  financial 
market equilibrium, the APT starts with the premise that arbitrage opportunities 1 
should not be present in efficient financial markets. This assumption is much less 
restrictive than those required to derive the CAPM. The APT starts by assuming that 
there are n factors which cause asset returns to systematically deviate from their 
expected values. The theory does not specify how large the number n is, nor does it 
                                                        
1  An arbitrage opportunity is an investment strategy that has the following properties: 1) the 
strategy's cost is zero; 2) the probability of  a negative payoff  is equal to zero; and 3) the 
probability of  a positive payoff  is greater than zero. In other words, the costless strategy can't 
lose, and it might win. 
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identify the factors. It simply assumes that these n factors together cause returns to 
vary. There may be other, firm specific reasons for returns to differ from their 
expected values, but these firm-specific deviations are not related across stocks. Since 
the firm-specific deviations are not related to one another, all return variation not 
related to the n common factors can be diversified away. Based on these assumptions, 
Ross shows that, in order to prevent arbitrage, an asset’s expected return must be a 
linear function of  its sensitivity to the n common factors: 
2 2( ) ...i f ik k i in nE R R β λ β λ β λ= + + + +                               [1] 
where ( )iE R  is the expected return to asset i, and fR  is the risk-free rate. Each 
ikβ  coefficient represents the sensitivity of  asset i to risk factor k, and kλ  
represents the risk premium for factor k. As with the CAPM, we have an expression 
for expected return that is a linear function of  the asset’s sensitivity to systematic risk. 
Under the assumptions of  APT, there are n sources of  systematic risk, where there is 
only one in a CAPM world. 
 
2.2.2 Empirical Evidence on Value Anomaly 
Brunnan and Xia (2001) defines the asset pricing anomaly as a statistically 
significant difference between the realized average returns associated with certain 
characteristics of  securities, or on portfolios of  securities formed on the basis of  
those characteristics, and those returns that are predicted by a particular asset pricing 
model. 
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One of  the most prominent anomalies in the contemporary asset pricing 
literature is the one related to the book-to-market ratio, well known as “value 
anomaly”. Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) firstly find that average returns on 
U.S. stocks are positively related to the ratio of  a firm’s book value of  common 
equity (BE), to its market value (ME). Later, Chan, Hamao, and Lakonishok (1991) 
find that book-to-market equity (B/M), also has strong role in explaining the 
cross-section of  average returns on Japanese stocks.  
Fama and French (1992) bring together size, leverage, E/P, B/M, and beta in a 
single cross-sectional study, and finds three important results.  First, they show that 
the previously documented positive relation between beta and average return was an 
artifact of  the negative correlation between firm size and beta. When this correlation 
is accounted for, the relation between beta and return disappears. Second, the authors 
compare the explanatory power of  size, leverage, E/P, B/M, and beta in 
cross-sectional regressions that span the 1963-1990 period. Their results indicate that 
B/M and size have the strongest relation to returns. The explanatory power of  the 
other variables vanishes when these two variables are included in the regressions.  
The results of  Fama and French (1992) are subjected to a high degree of  
scrutiny. Criticisms to this study have mainly focused on the issue of  data mining and 
survivorship bias. Black (1993a, 1993b) and MacKinlay (1995) suggest that the 
Fama/French results were likely a result of  data mining, since Fama and French 
chose their explanatory variables based on the results of  earlier empirical studies.  
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Another criticism of  the Fama and French results came from Kothari, Shanken 
and Sloan (1995), which main emphasize the survivorship bias exists in the 
COMPUSTAT dataset. As described by Banz and Breen (1986), Breen and Korajczyk 
(1994), and Kothari, Shanken and Sloan (1995), firms are typically brought into the 
Compustat files with several years of  historical data. Since many of  the firms that are 
excluded from Compustat are firms that had failed, it is likely that these firms had 
high B/M and low returns. Adding these firms to the database would reduce the 
explanatory power of  B/M, possibly eliminating it. 
Subsequent studies disapprove these criticisms and suggest that value anomaly is 
robust against survivorship bias. Davis (1994) constructed a database free of  
survivorship bias, and confirmed Fama and French (1992)’s results. Kim (1997) 
controlled for selection bias through filling in the missing data on COMPUSTAT 
with the Moody’s sample, and the results for book-to-market equity remain 
unchanged as using the COMPUSTAT sample only. Davis, Fama and French (2000) 
later provide additional evidence that the significant B/M effect is not an artifact of  
survivorship bias, using a much larger database over a longer sample period. Chan, 
Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1995) provided further evidence that the Fama and 
French (1992) results were not due to survivorship bias. Examining the 1968-1991 
period, they found that, when firms on CRSP and Compustat were properly matched, 
there were not enough firms missing from Compustat to have a significant effect on 
the Fama and French’s results. They also formed a dataset of  large firms for this 
period that is free of  survivorship bias. Using this dataset, they found a reliable B/M 
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effect. Barber and Lyon (1997) also found a significant B/M effect from the sample 
of  financial firms, which were excluded from the Fama/French sample. 
Capaul, Rowley and Sharpe (1993) found evidence of  B/M effect in the US and 
five other developed countries for the 1981-1992 period. Fama and French (1998) 
also found that B/M effect exists in other developed countries such as Japan, U.K. 
and France, as well as emerging markets like Hong Kong and Singapore. This 
international evidence provide more robust evidence supporting Fama and French 
(1992)’s results and B/M effect is persistent and not due to data mining.  
Whilst the presence of  B/M effect is undoubted, there is however, no consensus 
on the source of  the value premium. Generally, the explanations fall into two 
opposing views: the risk-based hypothesis which assumes an efficient market and, the 
mispricing hypothesis which assumes an inefficient market. The discussion below 
turns to these two explanations and how they help to establish what the value 
premium actually captures. 
 
2.2.3 Risk-Based Explanations 
Proponents of  the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) argue that higher returns 
of  value stocks are merely compensation for exposing the investors to higher 
systematic risk. They further argue that any evidence of  abnormal return is attributed 
to a misspecification of  asset pricing model. Evidence of  this argument is that 
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abnormal return (α) becomes insignificant when other risk factors are added to the 
single factor model. Essentially, Fama and French (1993) find that factors related to 
size and B/M (SMB and HML) are able to explain a significant amount of  the 
common variation in stock returns. For the 1963-1991 period, they run three-factor 
regressions of  the form: 
( )t t t t t t tR Rf a b Rm Rf sSMB hHML e− = + − + + +                           [2] 
where tR  is the monthly returns at time t, tRf  is the one-month Treasure bill rate at 
time t, tRm  is the returns on market portfolio at time t, tSMB  is the premium of  
returns on small stocks over returns on big stocks at time t, tHML  is the premium 
of  returns on high B/M stocks over returns on low B/M stocks at time t. 
The Fama and French (1993) results posit a risk-based explanation of  the return 
dispersion produced by size and B/M. The three-factor regression tends to produce 
significant coefficients on all three factors, and regression R2 values are close to one 
for most portfolios. This indicates that the three factors capture most of  the 
common variation in portfolio returns, with SMB and HML factor present 
independent sources of  systematic risk. According to the three factor model, small 
cap stocks and value stocks have high average returns because they are risky—they 
have high sensitivity to the risk factors that are being measured by SMB and HML.  
Fama and French (1995) further show that the anomalies in the CAPM model, 
such as size, earnings/price, book-to-market ratio, largely disappear in a three-factor 
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model. They argue that the book-to-market ratio and the slope of  HML proxy for 
relative distress. Weak firms with persistently poor profitability tend to have high 
B/M and positive slopes on HML; strong firms with persistently high profitability 
have low B/M and negative slopes on HML.2  
Fama and French (1996) test the three-factor model rigorously by examine 
returns on various portfolios form on firm characteristics like size, earnings/price, 
cash flow/price, B/M, past sales growth, long-term past return, and short-term past 
return. The results indicated that the three-factor asset pricing model captured most 
of  the average return anomalies except for the continuation of  short-term returns. 
Fama and French (1998) employ three-factor regressions in describing the 
returns on the global value and growth portfolios formed on B/M. They argue that 
the value premium from B/M can be referred to as compensation for a common risk 
factor. Consequently, the authors conclude that the superior returns of  value 
portfolios over growth portfolios are compensation for the risk not captured by the 
CAPM of  Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). Hence, they argue that the value 
premium is a proxy for a particular type of  risk related to relative financial distress. 
Chen and Zhang (1998) further examine the B/M effect in different markets and find 
that value stocks offer reliably higher returns in matured market like US., Japan, etc; 
but not in the high-growth markets of  Taiwan and Thailand. The authors explain this 
result as the spread of  the risk between value and growth stocks is small in those 
                                                        
2 Fama and French (1995) use earnings on book equity over four year before and five year after 
ranking date as measure of  persistent profitability. 
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growth market and the value firms are not be much riskier in a robust expansion 
market as well. The relationship between B/M effect and the market status make it 
worthwhile to examine the B/M effect in REIT market, which has experienced 
prominent growth during the past decade.  
In essence, this study would test the hypothesis that if  Chen and Zhang’s 
argument applies to REIT market, one would expect no or less value anomaly in the 
REIT market after 1990. Also, it would test the hypothesis that value stocks expose 
investors to higher risks which compensate for their higher returns.  
 
2.2.4 Behavioral Explanations 
In contrast to the risk-based story, there is a proposition that value stocks have 
higher returns because value stocks are underpriced due to their low growth 
expectation, while growth stocks are overpriced due to their high growth expectation.  
The behavioral explanation includes two perspectives. First, the value anomaly is 
caused by investors naively extrapolating the strong earnings growth of  low B/M 
stocks and the weak growth of  high B/M stocks. Low B/M stocks then have low 
average returns after portfolio formation because their earning growth is weaker than 
the market expects, and high B/M stocks have high average returns because their 
earnings growth is stronger than expected (Lakonishok, 1994). Second, value 
anomaly persists because arbitrage activity is costly and risky. In particular, the 
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arbitrage costs associated with value anomaly deter the trading activities that seek to 
exploit the anomaly (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
 
(a) Extrapolation Theory 
Lakonishok (1994) proposes that the premium associated with value stocks is 
caused by a naive extrapolation of  poor performance in the past into the future. In 
particular, investors assume value stocks, which have poor performance in the past, 
will continue to perform badly. As a result, their prices are valued lowly. However, 
these stocks tend to perform better than expected and over time, the market 
readjusts their pricing of  value stocks upwards, which then leads to a price increase. 
Conversely, growth stocks are assumed to persistently perform well, and highly 
priced. However, they fail to perform as expected and the market readjusted their 
pricing downwards.  
Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Wishny (1994) also suggest various reasons for the 
existence of  value premium. First, investors may simply have a preference for “good” 
companies with high levels of  profitability and superior management. 
Unsophisticated investors may equate a good company with a good investment 
irrespective of  price. Sophisticated institutional investors may gravitate toward 
well-known, growth stocks because these stocks are easier to justify to clients as 
prudent investments.  
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Empirical evidence on common stocks is generally consistent with the 
extrapolation theory. La Porta (1996) as well as Dechow and Sloan (1997) find 
evidence of  systematic errors in stock analysts’ expectations. Consistent with the 
extrapolation theory, stock prices appear to naively reflect analysts’ biased forecasts 
of  future earnings growth.  
La Porta et al.(1997) examine the stock returns around the future earnings 
announcement dates. If  investors in growth/value stocks become aware of  their 
expectational errors through subsequent earnings announcements, then the 
lower/higher stock returns associated with growth/value stocks should be 
concentrated around these subsequent earnings announcements. Their results 
indicated that a significant portion of  the return difference between value and 
growth stocks is attributable to earnings surprises that were systematically more 
positive for value stocks.  
A recent study of  Skinner and Sloan (2002) provide further evidence of  
expectational errors about future earnings performance causing value-growth 
anomaly. They find that growth stocks suffer disproportionately large negative stocks 
price reactions when they report earnings disappointment and show that this 




(b) Arbitrage Cost Theory 
Market efficiency hypothesis suggests that any mispricing in the market will be 
quickly eliminated by sophisticated investors exploiting this opportunity, and thus 
pulling back the prices to reflect fundamental values (e.g., Friedman, 1953). Shiller 
(1984) and De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990), however contend 
that mispricing can still exists in the presence of  rational traders, because arbitrage 
costs prevent the rational traders from taking full advantage of  mispricing. Pontiff  
(1996), for example, shows that arbitrage costs lead to large deviations of  prices from 
fundamental values in closed-end funds. Factors that have been identified to 
significantly influence arbitrage costs are: the security’s fundamental risk (which is 
unrelated to the risk of  other securities), dividend yield, transaction costs and interest 
rates. Unhedgeable fundamental risk lowers arbitrage profits because the arbitrageur 
is risk averse. Dividends enhance arbitrage profits since they reduce holding costs. 
Transaction costs lower arbitrage profits when the arbitrage position is initiated and 
closed. Interest rates are an opportunity cost, since arbitrageurs do not receive full 
interest on short-sale proceeds. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) note that arbitrage 
resources are concentrated in the hands of  a relatively few specialized and poor 
diversified traders. The risk-averse arbitrageurs are concerned about the idiosyncratic 
risk of  their portfolios, and volatility of  arbitrage returns will deter arbitrage activities. 
This study also notes that over a one-year horizon, a long position in a diversified 
portfolio of  high B/M stocks outperforms the S&P 500 only about 60% of  the time, 
although over 5 years the superior performance has been much more likely. But 
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arbitrageurs care more about the short-run performance, and desire to keep the ratio 
of  reward-to-risk over shorter horizons high, because they use capital provided by 
investors, who tend to withdraw funds if  the short-run performances is poor.  
The recent study of  Ali, Hwang and Trombley (2003) provide further evidence 
that the B/M effect is greater for stocks with higher arbitrage costs, which is 
consistent with the market-mispricing explanation for the anomaly. These high 
arbitrage costs are measured by higher idiosyncratic return volatility, higher 
transaction costs, and lower investor sophistication. In addition, idiosyncratic risk 
exhibits significant incremental power beyond transaction cost and investor 
sophistication measures in explaining cross-sectional variation in the B/M effect. 
This result is consistent with the Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and others, that risk 
associated with the volatility of  arbitrage returns deters arbitrage activity and is an 
important reason for the persistence of  the B/M-related mispricing.  
In this study, we will test the hypothesis that value anomaly in REIT market is 
caused by investors’ naïve extrapolation, and there is significant difference in earnings 
surprise of  value and growth REIT stocks. In addition, we will examine the effect of  
these arbitrage costs in the persistence of  value anomaly, with the hypothesis that 




2.3 Real Estate Literature 
2.3.1  Development of  REIT Market 
Real estate investment trust (REIT) was created by the U.S. Congress in 1960 for the 
purpose of  providing individuals an opportunity to invest in real estate assets and, at 
the same time, to enjoy the same benefits provided to shareholder in investment 
trusts (Chan, Erickson, and Wang, 2003). 
The REIT Act of  1960 ‘envisaged a conservative investment vehicle with 
pass-through features’ (McMahan, 1994). In fact, prior to the Tax Reform Act of  
1986, REITs were precluded from managing their own properties (L’ Engle, 1987). 
The pre-1990 REITs were regarded as ‘passive investment vehicles that owned 
diverse portfolios of  properties’ (Ross and Klein, 1994). REIT portfolios were 
typically static and perhaps best described as ‘diversification plays’ (Chadwick, 1993). 
Many pre-1990 REITs were also finite-horizon REITs which limited their growth 
potential because they were precommitted to liquidate at some terminal date. For 
example, Wang, Chan, and Gau (1992)’s sample includes 23 finite-horizon REITs out 
of  87 equity and mortgage REITs.  
The REIT market, however, experienced dramatic growth during 1990s. The 
market witnessed a remarkable increase in both the firm size and number of  REITs 
during this period. Exhibition 2.1 shows the average market capitalization and 
number of  public traded REIT from 1980 through 2004. The average market 
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capitalization of  REIT has been well below 100 million US dollars from 1980 to 
1991, however, it increased significantly from 112 million in 1992 to over 1.5 billion 
US dollars in 2004. The number of  publicly traded REITs also experienced 
significant increase in 1990s, from 138 in 1991 to 193 in 2004.  
Besides the high growth, REIT industry experienced significant structural 
changes which make REITs during 1990s more difficult to value. The evolution 
started with the Tax Reform Act (TRA) of  1986. The new act allowed REITs to be 
actively managed instead of  externally advised, which provided a greater alignment 
of  management and shareholder interests. The post-1990 REITs differ from their 
predecessors in their organization, business plans and ownership structure (Ross and 
Klein, 1994). Most of  the recent REITs are fully integrated operating companies that 
can be characterized as ‘management plays’ rather than as ‘passive vehicles’ (Chan, 
Erickson, and Wang, 2003). Because the post-1990 REITs are managed more actively, 
valuation of  REITs becomes more difficult because investors have to consider the 
“growth potential”, (Ling and Ryngaert, 1997). Chui, Titman, and Wei (2003b) also 
show that REITs during the post-1990 period have much higher volatility in returns 
and earnings than the pre-1990 period. 
The dramatic growth with greater valuation uncertainty of  REIT market, 
therefore, provides a good context to examine the alternative explanations to the 
value anomaly. Specifically, if  value anomaly is caused by risk, we would observe a 
weaker anomaly in post-1990 period than pre-1990 period. As suggested by Chen 
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and Zhang (1998), that value anomaly would be insignificant in high growth market, 
because the risk spread between value and growth stocks is smaller in expanding 
market. However, if  B/M proxies for growth expectation, the effect would only be 
prominent in the post-1990 period, when ‘growth potential’ became an important 
part in REITs’ valuation. 
Figure 2.1 Numbers and Average Market Capitalization of  Publicly Traded REIT 






































Number of REIT Average Market Capitalization
Source: NAREIT Web Site, 2005 
 
2.3.2  Pricing and Return Behavior of  REITs 
Since the main purpose of  this study is to examine the value anomaly of  REIT 
returns, it is important to know about the pricing and return behavior of  REITs. This 
section will firstly introduce studies on the integration of  REITs with the general 
stocks market, and then followed by studies about the market factors that affect the 
return of  REITs. Lastly, it will discuss studies on value anomaly in the REIT market. 
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(a) Integration of  REIT with Stock Market 
Lee and Stevenson (2005) provide a detailed review of  studies on the integration of  
REITs with stock market. The main consensus is that REITs are integrated with the 
general stock market, and the integration is most prominent during the 1990s.  
Li and Wang (1995), Oppenheimer and Grissom (1998), and Liang and Naranjo 
(1999) all find that REITs are integrated with stock market over the period of  1971 
to 1995. Liang, Naranjo (1999) further notice that the integration increases during the 
1990s. This view has also been supported by Glascock, Lu and So (2000), which 
shows that REITs are segmented from the common stock market from 1972 to 1991, 
while they are integrated from 1992 to 1996. The increasing integration of  REITs 
with common stock after 1990s, further reinforces the continued study of  the value 
effect which is an important issue in common stock market. 
 
(b) Market Factors Affecting REIT Returns 
Many studies have investigated the return association between REITs and the 
market factors, and find that there are relationships between REIT returns and the 
returns from stocks, bonds, and real estate market. Titman and Warga (1986), 
Gyourko and Linneman (1988), Chan, Hendershott, and Sanders (1990), Giliberto 
(1993), Myer and Webb (1993), Han and Liang (1995), and Oppenheimer and 
Grissom (1998), among others, show that there are relationships between REIT 
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returns and the returns of  stocks and bonds. In particular, Ghosh, Miles, and 
Sirmans (1996) find that correlation between REITs and the overall stock market 
have declined in recent years. Liang, McIntosh, and Webb (1995) also find that the 
systematic risk of  REITs, measured by beta, has a declining trend. 
Several studies further show that REIT stocks behave like small-cap stocks, 
because of  the typically small market capitalization of  REIT issues. For example, 
Colwell and Park (1990), Chan, Hendershott, and Sanders (1990), Liu and Mei (1992), 
Han and Liang (1995), Peterson and Hsieh (1997), Oppenheimer and Grissom (1998), 
and Chiang and Lee (2002) all report that the return behavior of  REITs (especially 
equity REITs) is similar to that of  a portfolio of  small stocks. Sanders (1998) 
suggests that REIT return behavior can best be described in terms of  the behavior 
of  a mixed-asset portfolio of  small stocks and corporate bonds. Clayton and 
MacKinnon (2003) find that REIT returns volatility was largely explained by 
large-cap stocks through 1970s and 1980s, then became more strongly related to both 
small cap stock and real estate-related factors in the 1990s.  
Peterson and Hsieh (1997) examines the REIT pricing and performance using 
the five-factor model of  Fama and French (1993). The authors find that risk 
premiums on equity REITs are significantly related to risk premiums on a market 
portfolio of  stocks as well as to the returns on mimicking portfolios for size and 
book-to-market equity factors (SMB and HML) in common stocks. The significant 
relationship between REIT returns and the Fama-French’s factors (SMB, HML) 
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provide a supportive evidence to test the risk-based theory using Fama-French’s 
three-factor model. 
 
(c) Value Anomaly in REIT Returns 
Chen, et al. (1998) analyze REIT returns using firm-specific and macroeconomic 
variables. They found that firm size is an important factor for REIT returns, with a 
significantly negative coefficient. Their study also finds that B/M ratio is not a 
significant factor, which the authors attribute to two explanations: first, B/M does 
not have the same meanings for REIT as for common stocks; second, if  B/M is 
interpreted as a distress factor, it is possible that this factor behaves in a similar 
fashion for firms in the same industry.  
This study motivates us to further examine the value anomaly of  REITs. First, as 
their sample period of  1978 to 1994 is mostly within the pre-1990 period, when 
REITs have less growth potential, it is likely that the non-significant relationship on 
B/M ratio is due to the less valuation uncertainty in this period. It is necessary to test 
the value anomaly in the post-1990 period, when valuation uncertainty is much 
higher, and compare it with the pre-1990 period. Second, Chen et al. (1998) argue 
that if  B/M represents distress risk, it would behave in a similar fashion for firms in 
the same industry. This allows us to further examine the risks associated with value 
and growth REITs.  
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Another gap arises from Chui, Titman and Wei (2003), which finds a weak 
relationship between B/M and REIT return for both pre-1990s period and 
post-1990s period. Since their study is using a semi-annual holding period, while B/M 
effect is more significant over longer period (Shleifer, and Vishny, 1997), it is likely 
the weak effect of  B/M in their study is due to the short holding period. Similarly, 
most previous studies on cross-sectional REIT returns only examine the short- or 
intermediate-term returns (daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, and semi-annually),3 
while there is few studies ever examined the long-term REIT returns over 3 to 5 
years. In contrast, this study examines the pricing and return behavior of  value and 
growth REITs over a much longer investment horizon, up to five years.  
This study could also be compared with the results from a working paper of  
Gentry, Jones, and Mayer (2004).  Using the net asset value (NAV) to price ratio as 
an indicator of  value and growth REIT stocks, the authors found significant value 
anomaly in REIT returns since 1990. Their study differs with ours in two 
perspectives. First, the choice of  indicator for value and growth stocks, which will be 
detailed discussed in the next chapter. Second, their holding period for value and 
growth stocks is much shorter, from daily to three months. Since NAV data is 
released quarterly and monthly, while book equity data is released annually, the value 
anomaly based on NAV/Price might well be captured in shorter holding periods. 
 
                                                        
3  See for example, Mei and Liu (1994); Mei and Gao (1995); Nelling and Gyourko (1998); 
Cooper, Downs, and Patterson (1999); and Ling, Naranjo, and Ryngaert (2000). 
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2.4 Summary 
Financial studies consistently find that high B/M stocks outperform low B/M 
stocks over the hold periods of  three to five years, which is well known as “value 
anomaly”. Two different theories are raised to explain this effect. The risk-based 
theory posits that B/M is a proxy for risk, and the superior returns associated with 
high B/M stocks are just compensation for their high risk. Alternatively, the 
extrapolation theory suggests that B/M proxies for growth expectation. High B/M 
stocks have superior returns because investors overly extrapolate their poor past 
performance and undervalue their future growth rate.  
REIT market experienced structural change during early 1990s, while REITs 
pre-1990s have little growth potential, the post-1990s REITs have more growth 
opportunity, and there is more valuation uncertainty in REITs during 1990s. This 
provides a good context to examine the value anomaly. Studies on real estate have 
found that REIT market is increasingly integrated with the general stocks market and 
Fama and French’s three-factor have significant relationship with REIT returns. 
However, previous studies found that evidence of  value anomaly of  REIT returns 
was weak during the pre-1990 period, and also B/M has insignificant effect over 
short-term holding period returns. There are some knowledge gaps on the value 
anomaly of  REITs returns during post-1990 period, and over long-term investment 
horizon. In particular, the main research hypothesis of  this study would be: There is 
significant value anomaly in long-term REIT returns during the post-1990 period.  
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Figure 3.1 further illustrates the flow of  study and the specific hypotheses in 
each section. This study covers three aspects of  the value anomaly: the existence of  
value anomaly, the cause of  value anomaly, and the reason for it persistence. In 
particular, two different hypotheses which are based on the efficient market and the 
inefficient market are tested for the cause of  value anomaly; also the arbitrage cost 













Figure 3.1 Flowchart of  the Study 
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CHAPTER THREE 
METHODOLOGY, DATA, AND HYPOTHESIS 
3.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 has discussed the four main hypotheses of  this study, specifically: Is there 
significant value anomaly in REIT returns?  Are value REIT stocks exposing investors 
to greater risks?  Is value anomaly caused by investors’ naïve extrapolation?  Is the 
persistence of  value anomaly caused by arbitrage costs, especially the idiosyncratic risk? 
This Chapter introduces the methodologies employed in the study. It also includes 
the data set as well as the specific hypotheses that will be tested in the following chapters. 
In particular, this chapter will cover the formation of  value and growth REIT portfolios 
and the examination of  value anomaly, then it will introduce the risk analysis of  these 
value and growth portfolios. Finally it will discuss methods to test the change of  
valuation uncertainty and extrapolation model as well as the arbitrage cost theory.  
 
3.2 Formation of  Value and Growth REIT Portfolios 
To determine whether individual REITs fall into value or growth stocks, we 
construct five portfolios in June each year (t) from 1982 to 2000.1 Book-to-market equity 
                                                        
1  Although the sample period is from 1981 to 2003, the portfolio construction starts from 1991 
because the B/M ratio for the preceding year was used as a sorting variable. Similarly, we terminate 
the portfolio construction in 2000 to allow for a full holding period (3-year) to be analyzed. 
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(B/M) ratio is used as the main criteria of  value and growth stocks. B/M is calculated as 
book value per share in the fiscal year end of  year t-1 (adjusted for subsequent stock 
splits and stock dividends) divided by stock price at the end of  June of  year t.  
Gentry, Jones and Mayer (2004) used the Net Asset Value to Price (NAV/P) ratio as 
the criteria for value and growth REIT stocks. Net asset value (NAV) is the estimation of  
the market value of  properties owned by a REIT, and the growth opportunities have 
already been included in it. Thus, when comparing stock prices to NAV, the differences 
can largely be attributed to the organizational structure and management, rather than 
growth expectations (Capozza and Seguin, 2003). Since growth expectation is an 
important factor in this study, the book-to-market ratio is employed. Furthermore, there 
are another two disadvantages with NAV, which further lead to the preference of  B/M. 
First, the coverage of  the Green Street’s NAV data is small (only 16 REITs in 1990 and 
still less than 60 in 2000). Second, the estimation of  NAV from Green Street is not 
public information, which is not available for most individual investors.  
Based on their B/M, REIT stocks are sorted into five quintile portfolios each year 
from 1982 to 2000. Specifically, REIT stocks in the top 20% B/M are placed in the value 
portfolio (Q1), whilst those in the bottom 20% are placed in growth portfolio (Q5). The 
remaining REIT stocks are placed in the intermediate portfolios, Q2 (21-40% B/M), Q3 
(41-60% B/M) and Q4 (61-80% B/M). This produces in total 95 portfolios over 19 years 
(1982-2000). Firm characteristics like market capitalization, leverage are also presented 
with each portfolio.  
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All REITs (including equity, mortgage, and hybrid) traded on NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ over the 1981-2003 period are selected as the sample set. Following Chui, 
Titman, and Wei (2003), we include all types of  REITs so that we can have a larger 
sample in the pre-1990 period. Nevertheless, there are only 12 mortgage and hybrid 
REITs in our sample. Excluding mortgage and hybrid REITs from our sample does not 
change the results significantly, as those REITs tend to distribute symmetrically in value 
and growth stocks (see Table a.1 in Appendix 1). 
As with Fama and French (1992), we drop firms with negative book value and 
extreme observations with the highest and lowest 0.5% of  values for B/M. To reduce the 
survivorship-bias of  COMPUSTAT, we also exclude the first year data when a REIT is 
included in COMPUSTAT.2 Some of  our formation strategies require five years of  past 
accounting data. In total, this study covers 140 REITs during the period of  1982 to 2003. 
The average number of  observation during the full sample, pre-1990 period and 
post-1990 period is 72, 34, and 107, respectively. The small sample size during pre-1990 
period does not bias our results. When we divide the pre-1990 REITs into three 
portfolios instead of  five, the results for value and growth portfolios remain unchanged 
(see Table a.2 in Appendix 2).  
 
                                                        
2  Fama and French (1995) and Barber and Lyon (1997) exclude two and five years data, 
respectively, prior to the ranking year, to eliminate the survivorship-bias associated with the 
back-filling of  COMPUSTAT. We exclude only one year data because of  the limited number of  
observations within the sample period. 
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3.3 Examination of  Value Anomaly 
As discussed in the previous chapters, there are two predications towards the value 
anomaly in REIT returns over the sample period. Specifically, if  value anomaly is caused 
by risk, the effect would be smaller in post-1990s when the market experiences dramatic 
growth. On the contrary, if  value anomaly is caused by mispricing, we would observe 
stronger anomaly in post-1990s when valuation uncertainty is much higher.  
Each year, for each portfolio, we compute the equally-weighted buy and hold returns 
over three holding periods: 12 months, 24 months and 36 months beginning in July of  
year t. If  a stock disappears from the CRSP database during a particular year, its return is 
replaced until the end of  that year with a return on the value-weighted stocks market 
index, and it will be removed from the portfolio for the following years. 
Difference in returns of  the extreme B/M portfolios, Q1-Q5 return, is computed 
for each sample year, with t-statistics calculated as mean divided by standard error of  the 
annual estimates. Since the portfolios are to be rebalanced each year at the end of  June, 
there will be serial correlation in the returns induced by overlapping holding periods for 
return horizons greater than one year. To correct for this bias, we apply Newey and West 
(1987) procedure to estimate the standard error of  the means. Return difference of  value 
and growth portfolios, Q1-Q5 return, is also calculated for common stocks during the 
same period.  
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Leverage of  REITs in the two sub-periods is also examined to see whether value 
anomaly is caused by high leverage of  value stocks. We measure leverage as the 
long-term debt divided by common equity. Besides that, the holding period returns are 
also adjusted to control for size-effect. Five portfolios of  REIT stocks are constructed 
each year based on their market capitalization in June of  the previous year. The 
equally-weighted returns for each portfolio are then computed, as the size benchmark 
returns. Size-adjusted return for each stock is then calculated by subtracting off  the 
return on the corresponding size benchmark portfolio consisting of  REIT stocks in the 
same size-quintile. Both the raw returns and size-adjusted returns on the value portfolio 
(Q1) and the growth portfolio (Q5) are then compared to see whether significant value 
effect exists in the pre-1990s and post-1990s periods. 
 
3.4 Risk Analysis of  Value and Growth REIT Portfolios 
To examine the risk-based explanation to the value anomaly, we analyze the risk of  
value and growth REIT portfolios. The hypothesis on risk-based theory is that, value 
stocks’ higher returns are associated with higher risk, after adjusting for the risk, their 
abnormal returns will be close to zero. Several conventional risk and performance 
measurements are employed to analyze the risk of  value and growth REIT portfolios: 
standard deviation, coefficient of  variation, Sharpe-ratio, Treynor-ratio, as well as factor 
loadings from CAPM and Fama-French’s three factor model.  
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Coefficient of  variation measures the volatility of  returns by dividing the standard 
deviation of  returns over the mean return.  
Sharpe-ratio measures risk-adjusted performance by subtracting the risk free rate 
from the rate of  return for a portfolio and dividing the result by the standard deviation 
of  the portfolio returns.  





                                   [1] 
Treynor ratio measures returns earned in excess of  that which could have been 
earned on a riskless investment per each unit of  market risk.    






Where Rp and Rf is the return of  the portfolio and risk-free rate; pσ  and pβ  is the 
standard deviation and beta of  the portfolio returns, respectively. 
CAPM beta measures the systematic risk on general stocks market. The excess 
returns of  the market (Rm-Rf), is the value-weight return on all NYSE, AMEX, and 
NASDAQ stocks (from CRSP) minus the one-month Treasury bill rate.  
The factor loading from Fama-French three factors models are risks associated with 
firm size and book-to-market ratio. In particular, the factors (SMB and HML) 
constructed using the 6 value-weight portfolios formed on size and book-to-market. 
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SMB (Small minus Big) is the average return on the three small portfolios minus the 
average return on the three big portfolios: 
SMB = 1/3 (Small Value + Small Neutral + Small Growth) - 1/3 (Big Value + Big 
Neutral + Big Growth).          
HML (High minus Low) is the average return on the two value portfolios minus the 
average return on the two growth portfolios: 
HML = 1/2 (Small Value + Big Value) - 1/2 (Small Growth + Big Growth).    
 
3.5 Extrapolation Model and Valuation Uncertainty  
The next objective of  this study is to examine whether the value anomaly is caused 
by investors’ naïve extrapolation. Under this hypothesis, the value anomaly in REIT 
returns would be more severe in post-1990 period as valuation uncertainty is higher. Four 
tests are employed to test this hypothesis specifically.  
First, the extrapolation model suggest that value stocks have low past growth rate, 
and investors extrapolate this poor growth rate into the future, resulting in low growth 
expectation towards value stocks. While the actual future growth rate of  value REIT 
stocks would surpass the growth rate expected by the market. Conversely, the actual 
growth rate of  growth REIT stocks would lag behind the market’s expectation. 
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To test this hypothesis, we compare the actual growth rates of  the portfolio to both 
their past and expected growth rates. Dividend and Funds from Operation (FFO) 3 are 
used here to explore the growth rates of  value and growth stocks. The actual growth rate 
of  a portfolio is computed as follows: for each of  the 5 portfolios (Q1 to Q5), an 
investor is assumed to invest $1 in each stock in the first year. In the case of  dividend 
growth, we compute the dividends earned by each portfolio in each year of  the holding 
period by multiplying each stock’s dividend per share with its proportionate weight in the 
portfolio (i.e. 1/stock price as at year 1). From this, we compute the dividend growth rate 
of  each portfolio from year 1 to year 3. Similar computation is repeated to derive the 
actual growth rate for the FFO. The expected future growth rates of  a stock can be 





ρ +− =                                             [4] 
where Ct+1 is the next period cash flow, Pt is the current stock price, r is the required rate 
of  return on the stock, g is the expected growth rate of  cash flow, and ρ is the payout 
ratio for cash flows. Rearranging Equation [3], the expected growth rate can be 
computed as follows: g = r – ρ (C/P), which is a function of  the required rate of  return 
(r) and the stock’s payout ratio ( ρ ) and cash flow/price ratio (C/P). Holding the 
discount rates and payout ratios constant for all REIT stocks, we can compare the 
expected growth rates based on the valuation multipliers: Dividend/Price (D/P) and 
                                                        
3 FFO is used here instead of  earnings because FFO adds back the appreciation or depreciation, and 
subtracts the gains on property sales. Since property appreciation/depreciation is a significant part for 
real estate property, FFO represents a better valuation item for REIT. 
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Funds from Operation/Price (FFO/P).4 The differences in valuation multipliers are 
then compared with difference in actual growth rates of  the growth and value REIT 
portfolios to determine the extent of  errors made in extrapolating the stocks’ future 
growth rates.  
Second, extrapolation theory further posits that if  investors in growth/value stocks 
become aware of  their expectational errors through subsequent earnings announcements, 
therefore market reactions to the quarterly earnings announcements should be more 
positive for the value portfolios as compared to growth portfolios. We test whether 
earnings surprises in the five years after formation are significantly positive for value 
stocks and negative for growth REIT stocks as prescribed by the extrapolation model. 
Following the methodology employed by La Porta et al. (1997), we compute the quarterly 
earnings announcement returns over a 3-day window (t-1, t+1) around the event. The 
announcement dates are collected from the COMPUSTAT database. For each quarter, 
the 3-day, buy-and-hold portfolio event returns are computed assuming the stocks in the 
portfolio are equally-weighted. 
Third, as Fama and French (1995) argued that if  the low post-formation returns of  
low B/M stocks are due to incorrect extrapolation of  strong past earnings growth, the 
low returns should be temporary. Similarly, the high average returns on high B/M stocks 
would last for only several years. 
                                                        
4  For several reasons, REIT provides a good sample to examine this model. First, REITs can be 
viewed as a relatively large and homogeneous industry group, so the discount rate in this industry can 
be view as homogeneous also. Second, the payout ratio restrictions in REIT make the dividend and 
FFO more comparable and meaningful in this industry. 
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To test this hypothesis, the returns of  value and growth REIT portfolios are traced 
over an eight-year horizon (three years before portfolio formation plus five years after 
portfolio formation). For the extrapolation theory to hold, the portfolio comprising 
value REIT stocks should register poor pre-formation performance but superior 
post-formation performance. Also the superior post-formation will gradually decrease as 
investors correct their expectational errors.  
Furthermore, Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (2001) suggest that mispricing 
would be stronger in the market with higher valuation uncertainty. Under this hypothesis, 
expectational errors would not be observed in pre-1990 period, when it was 
straightforward to value a REIT.   
To test this argument, we would first compare the valuation uncertainty in the two 
periods. Specifically, we use Coefficient of  Variation (CV) in Funds from Operations 
(FFO) and Dividend to measure the valuation uncertainty. And examine the change of  
valuation uncertainty during the two periods. Then, we repeat the test of  extrapolation 
model in the pre-1990 period, to examine the hypothesis of  no investors’ expectational 




3.6 Arbitrage Costs and the Existence of  Value Anomaly 
The above tests on risk and extrapolation model would give an explanation for the 
existence of  value anomaly in REIT returns, while this section will further discuss the 
persistence of  value anomaly.  
If  value anomaly is caused by risk, and there is no positive abnormal return after 
adjusting the risk, then the premium of  value stocks will exist just as compensation for 
their risk. However, if  value anomaly is caused by mispricing due to systematic bias in 
expectations, then why do not rational traders exploit this opportunity and quickly 
eliminate the mispricing? Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that mispricing can still exist 
in the presence of  rational traders, because arbitrage costs prevent the rational traders 
from taking full advantage of  mispricing. Idiosyncratic risk, transaction costs, and 
investor sophistications are all important factors of  arbitrage costs which deter the 
arbitrageurs from fully trading away the value effect. Chapter 7 would specifically test 
which factors have significant relationship with the existence of  value anomaly in REIT 
returns.  
To specifically determine the role of  each factor in the existence of  B/M effect, we 
use the multiple regression tests as in Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003). In particular, we 
will estimate a model that includes all these arbitrage cost measurements as well beta and 
the B/M:  
1
0 1 2 3 4
1
5 6 7 8
/ / * / *
/ * ( ) ( )
Re3 b b Beta b B M b B M Ivolatility b B M Price
b B M D Analyst b Ivolatility b Price b Ln ME e
−
−
= + + + +
+ + + + +    [3] 
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Re3 is the buy-and-hold return over 36 month beginning in July of  year t, we use 
3-year holding period to be consistent with our observation period of  risk analysis.  
Ivolatility is the measure of  idiosyncratic risk, which is obtained by regressing 
monthly returns on the market portfolio over a maximum of  36 months ending in June 
of  year t.  
Price is employed as a measure of  transaction cost. Bhardwaj and Brooks (1992) and 
Blume and Goldstein (1992) suggests that quoted bid-ask spreads and commissions per 
share as a percentage of  share price are inversely related to share price. Thus, we use 
closing share price (Price) in June of  year t as the measure of  transaction costs.  
D(Analyst) is employed as a measure of  investor sophistication. Hereby, we use 
numbers of  analyst following (analyst coverage) as the measure for investor 
sophistication. Consider the fact that a large number of  REITs are not covered by analyst, 
we employ a dummy variable (D(Analyst)) which takes the value of  1 if  a REIT is 
covered by analyst and 0 if  not covered. The institutional investors’ ownership is also an 
important factor for investor sophistication; however, due to the scarcity of  data source, 
we could not incorporate this variable in the regression. Anyway, this would not bias our 
result significantly, as the investor sophistication is already captured thought analyst 
coverage.  
Market capitalization (ME) is also included in the regression. Lakonishok, Shleifer 
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and Wishny (1994) suggest firm size as a proxy for arbitrage costs and investor 
sophistication. To facilitate comparability with prior studies, we also examine the effect 
of  firm size on the value anomaly. 
The coefficients on the interaction terms in Equation [3] capture how the B/M 
effect varies cross-sectionally with the effect of  idiosyncratic risk, transaction cost and 
investor sophistication. The hypothesis is that: if  persistence of  value anomaly is due to 
these arbitrage costs, significantly negative coefficient would be observed for the 
interaction terms.  
 
3.7 Summary 
This chapter introduces the methodology, hypothesis, and data that will be employed 
in this study. The main hypothesis of  this study is that whether value anomaly exists in 
REIT returns during the pre-1990 and post-1990 period. Meanwhile, the explosive 
growth and increasing valuation uncertainty in REITs during 1990s provide a good 
context to further examine the cause of  value anomaly from a risk-based theory and a 
mispricing theory. In particular, we analyze the risk measures and investors’ extrapolation 
on value and growth REITs stocks, over the pre-1990 and post-1990 periods. Finally, we 
examine the relationship between value anomaly and different measures of  arbitrage cost, 




THE EXISTENCE OF VALUE ANOMALY  
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents evidence for the existence of  value anomaly in REIT 
market. In particular, we will test the hypothesis that significant value anomaly exists 
in the post-1990 period. As described in the previous chapter, REIT stocks are 
divided into 5 portfolios based on their B/M ratio. With Q1 having REITs with the 
top 20% B/M, and Q5 having the bottom 20% B/M. The returns of  value and 
growth REIT portfolios over 1 to 3 years holding periods are then compared to test 
for the value anomaly. In addition, firm characteristics like market capitalization and 
leverage are also examined to see whether value anomaly is caused by these factors.  
 
4.2 Summary Statistics of  Value and Growth REITs 
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for the value and growth REIT portfolios, 
during the period of  1982 through 2000. The numbers presented are the average 
across each sample periods. Difference in the extreme B/M portfolios, Q1-Q5, is 
presented, with t-statistics calculated as mean divided by standard error of  the annual 
estimates. For the whole sample period, REIT market has B/M ranges from 0.28 for 
the growth portfolio to 1.74 for the value portfolio. The B/M for the Q2, Q3 and Q4 
portfolios are 0.942, 0.715 and 0.487, respectively. The two sub-periods also have the 
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similar B/M variations for from value through growth portfolios, ranges from 0.24 to 
1.57, and 0.32 to 1.90 for the pre-1990 and post-1990 sub-period, respectively. 
Table 4.1 also shows that firm size and leverage for value and growth REIT 
during the two periods. Firm size as measured by market capitalization increases 
significantly in the post-1990 period, with the all REITs average size increase from 
169 million in pre-1990 to 485 million in post-1990 period. Besides that, we find firm 
size increases monotonously with B/M. To examine whether value anomaly in REIT 
returns is caused by the size effect, size-adjusted returns are calculated in the 
following examination of  value anomaly.  
Leverage of  REITs suggests a contrary pattern with common stocks, that value 
REIT stocks have significantly lower leverage than growth REIT stocks. This is 
mainly due to the special financing characteristics of  REIT. High dividend 
distribution requirement for REIT greatly limits their ability to finance growth with 
retained earnings, as a result, REITs with more growth opportunity have to resort 
more on external financing, which increases their leverage. Consistent with this 
argument, we found that leverage of  REITs increase significantly during 1990s, as 
REITs have more growth opportunities than pre-1990 period. In addition, value 
REITs portfolio show the most significant increase of  leverage, which would be a 





Table 4.1 Summary statistics for Value and Growth REIT Stocks  
For each year from 1982 to 2000, REITs stocks are assigned to five quintile portfolios based 
on the value of  B/M, calculated as book equity in fiscal end year t-1 divided by market value 
of  equity at the end of  June of  year t. For each B/M quintile, means of  the following 
variables are calculated: ME is market value of  equity in millions at the end of  June of  year t. 










Year: 1982- 2000       
Average Number of  observations    72  
B/M 1.74 0.94 0.72 0.49 0.28 0.849 1.46*** 
ME 102  211 339 424 593  340 -491*** 
Leverage 0.96 0.76 0.88 1.25 2.10 1.18   -1.04 *** 
Year: 1982-1990       
Average Number of  observations    34  
B/M 1.57 0.92 0.70 0.42 0.24 0.77 1.33*** 
ME 60 86 104 187 409 169 -348*** 
Leverage 0.58 0.66 0.73 1.29 1.98 1.05   -1.40 *** 
Year: 1991-2000       
Average Number of  observations    107  
B/M 1.90 0.96 0.73 0.55 0.32 0.91 1.57*** 
ME 143 317 528 629 796 485 -653*** 
Leverage 1.34 0.86 1.05 1.21 2.16 1.32   -0.82 ** 
Source: Compustat database, Author’s calculation. 
To confirm that REIT market has a comparable variation of  B/M ratios with 
common stocks, Table 4.2 presents the B/M ratios for Common Stocks within the 
same sample periods. Common stocks have the B/M ratio ranges from 0.31 for 
growth portfolio to 4.69 for value portfolio in the whole sample period. The B/M for 
Q2, Q3 and Q4 portfolios are 1.02, 0.76, and 0.54, respectively. The two sub-periods 
also have similar figures for corresponding portfolios. Compare the B/M ratio of  
common stocks with that of  REIT stocks, we find these two markets have similar 
value of  B/M for corresponding portfolios from Q2 to Q5, especially for the 
post-1990 period. The only exception is that common stocks have much higher B/M 
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ratios for value portfolio (Q1) than REIT stocks. This is probably due to that 
French’s data does not exclude those stocks with extremely high B/M. Once those 
extremely observations are excluded, the average B/M ratio for value portfolio (Q1) 
and growth portfolio (Q5) would be 1.877 and 0.198, as in Ali, Hwang, and 
Trombley (2003). In conclusion, REIT market has a wide variation in B/M ratios that 
is with common stocks, thus justifies using B/M as the criteria for value and growth 
stocks in REITs. 
Table 4.2 Book-to-Market Ratio of  Value and Growth Portfolios in Common Stocks  
B/M Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
1982-1990 4.59 1.16 0.88 0.63 0.37 
1991-2000 4.79 0.90 0.65 0.45 0.25 
1982-2000 4.69 1.02 0.76 0.54 0.31 
Source: Kenneth R. French’s Data Library. 
 
Once the wide variation of  B/M ratio with REITs is confirmed, another natural 
question would be the persistence of  individual REITs within each quintile. In other 
words, we would examine whether the value (Q1) and growth (Q5) quintile contain 
the same set of  REITs over the sample period, or does this classification jump 
around. Table 4.3 presents examples of  value and growth REITs during the 1982 to 
2000 period. The selection is based the average quintile of  each REIT over the 
sample period. REITs listed in Value Portfolios (Q1) have on average quintile of  1.5 
and below, whilst those listed in Growth Portfolios (Q5) have average quintile of  4.5 
and above. For each REIT, we report the average quintile and the standard deviation 
of  quintiles over the sample period. For most REITs, the standard deviation is less 
than 1, suggesting a persistent value-growth profile for individual REITs within each 
quintile.  
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Table 4.3: Examples of  Value and Growth REITs (1982 to 2000) 
Listed below are individual REITs that have consistently been allocated to Q1 (value portfolios) and Q5 (growth portfolios). The selection is based the average quintile 
of  each REIT over the sample period. REITs listed in Q1 have on average quintile of  1.5 and below, whilst those listed in Q5 have average quintile of  4.5 and above. 
Standard deviation of  the quintiles for each individual REIT over the sample period is also reported.   
REITs in the Value Portfolios    REITs in the Growth Portfolios    
REIT Name Avg. Quintile Stdev.  Avg. Quintile Stdev. 
BRT REALTY TRUST 1.43 0.96 DEVELOPERS DIVERSIFIED RLTY 4.50 0.55 
HANOVER CAPITAL MTG HOLDINGS 1.00 0.00 FEDERAL REALTY INVS TRUST 4.52 0.58 
INCOME OPPORTUNITY RLTY INVS 1.00 0.00 ALEXANDRIA R E EQUITIES INC 4.67 0.58 
LASER MORTGAGE MGT INC 1.00 0.00 BOSTON PROPERTIES INC 4.67 0.58 
NOVASTAR FINANCIAL INC 1.00 0.00 CHELSEA PROPERTY GROUP INC 4.67 0.52 
PRIME GROUP REALTY TRUST 1.00 0.00 SIMON PROPERTY GROUP INC 4.67 0.52 
TRANSCONTINENTAL RLTY 1.00 0.00 HEALTH CARE PPTYS INVEST INC 4.58 0.77 
MAXUS REALTY TRUST INC 1.14 0.36 TOWN & COUNTRY TRUST 4.83 0.41 
AMERICAN LAND LEASE INC 1.31 0.63 HOST MARRIOTT CORP 4.95 0.23 
KOGER EQUITY INC 1.36 0.67 VORNADO REALTY TRUST 4.51 1.27 
URSTADT BIDDLE PROPERTIES 1.26 0.45 WEINGARTEN REALTY INVST 4.86 0.36 
RFS HOTEL INVESTORS INC 1.33 0.52 CHATEAU COMMUNITIES INC 5.00 0.00 
MFA MORTGAGE INVESTMENTS INC 1.40 0.70 GENERAL GROWTH PPTYS INC 5.00 0.00 
APEX MORTGAGE CAPITAL INC 1.50 0.71 KIMCO REALTY CORP 5.00 0.00 
ENTERTAINMENT PROPERTIES TR 1.50 0.71 MILLS CORP 5.00 0.00 
HOSPITALITY PROPERTIES TRUST 1.50 0.58 PENNSYLVANIA RE INVS TRUST 4.53 0.61 
PARKWAY PROPERTIES INC 1.33 0.69 ROUSE CO 5.00 0.00 
PMC COMMERCIAL TRUST 1.50 0.55 UNITED MOBILE HOMES INC 4.87 0.35 
RAMCO-GERSHENSON PROPERTIES 1.44 0.81 WASHINGTON REIT 4.84 0.37 
SIZELER PROPERTY INVESTORS 1.48 0.51    
Source: Compustat database, Author’s calculation 
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4.3 Returns of  Value and Growth REITs Portfolios 
REIT market has experienced explosive growth with higher valuation 
uncertainty during 1990s, and two predictions are raised upon the value anomaly in 
REIT returns pre- and post-1990 period. The first predicts a weaker value anomaly in 
REITs during post-1990 period than pre-1990 period due to smaller risk spread 
between value and growth stocks in expanding market condition (Chen and Zhang, 
1998). The second predicts a more prominent value anomaly in post-1990 period due 
to higher valuation uncertainty during 1990s (Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 
2001).  
Table 4.4 shows the returns associated with three different holding period 
returns for the various portfolios during the pre-1990, post-1990 and full period. The 
raw buy and hold returns are reported as well as size-adjusted returns. The numbers 
presented are the average across each sample periods. Three main findings can be 







Table 4.4 Returns to Value and Growth REIT Portfolios  
Re1, Re2, and Re3 are the one-year, two-year, and three-year buy-and-hold return, respectively, 
beginning July of  year t. SRe1, SRe2, and SRe3 are the size-adjusted one-year, two-year, and 
three-year buy-and-hold return, respectively, beginning in July of  year t, defined as raw 
buy-and-hold return less size-quintile return, where size deciles are based on all REIT stocks. 
Statistical significance is reported for difference in the values of  Q1 and Q5 portfolios, 
Q1-Q5 Diff. The t-statistic is computed as mean divided by standard error of  the annual 
estimates. To correct for serial correlation in returns induced by overlapping holding periods 
for return horizons greater than one year, we use the Newey and West (1987) corrected 
standard error of  the means. ***, **, and * indicate significance at better than the 1%, 5%, 










Panel A: 1982- 2000       
Re1 0.191 0.173 0.152 0.194 0.187 0.148 0.004 
Re2 0.366 0.199 0.273 0.232 0.253 0.210 0.113 
Re3 0.748 0.498 0.555 0.543 0.618 0.501 0.130 
SRe1 0.012 -0.018 0.004 0.015 0.017 0.006 -0.005 
SRe2 0.098 -0.065 0.006 0.003 0.019 0.011 0.079 
SRe3 0.143 -0.058 0.007 -0.016 0.062 0.029 0.081 
        
Panel B: 1982-1990       
Re1 0.134 0.212 0.123 0.251 0.220 0.182 -0.086* 
Re2 0.231 0.291 0.315 0.435 0.391 0.326 -0.160* 
Re3 0.430 0.503 0.552 0.654 0.697 0.537 -0.268 
SRe1 -0.027 0.014 -0.018 0.042 -0.019 0.000 -0.008 
SRe2 -0.008 -0.038 0.031 0.028 -0.002 0.000 -0.006 
SRe3 -0.070 -0.030 0.069 0.007 0.058 -0.002 -0.127 
        
Panel C: 1991-2000       
Re1 0.243 0.138 0.177 0.143 0.158 0.172 0.085** 
Re2 0.637 0.308 0.373 0.313 0.358 0.389 0.279*** 
Re3 1.034 0.493 0.557 0.443 0.547 0.587 0.487*** 
SRe1 0.035 0.002 -0.007 -0.005 -0.008 0.000 0.041*** 
SRe2 0.049 -0.004 -0.016 -0.053 -0.058 0.000 0.097*** 
SRe3 0.052 -0.014 -0.046 -0.081 -0.104 0.000 0.122*** 




First, consistent with those evidence in common stock market, value REIT 
stocks (Q1) tend to outperform growth REIT stocks (Q5). The positive values 
reported in the last column of  Table 4.3 indicate that the average return from value 
REIT portfolios is higher than the growth REIT portfolios over different holding 
horizons. However, the outperformance of  value REIT stocks is only significant 
during the post-1990 period (In particular, the return spread between value and 
growth REIT stocks is 8.5%, 27.9%, and 48.7% for the one-, two- and three-year 
holding period, respectively). There is no evidence of  value anomaly in pre-1990 
period, and value REIT stocks even significantly underperform growth REIT stocks 
for the one- and two-year holding period returns (also for three-year holding period 
return, but not significant). This result gives answer to the first research question that 
value anomaly of  REIT returns is only significant in post-1990 period. Meanwhile, it 
provides the evidence that is consistent with the Daniel, Hirshleifer, and 
Subrahmanyam(2001)’s model, while inconsistent with Chen and Zhang (1998)’s 
argument. This provides evidence that the value anomaly in REIT market is mainly 
caused by misvaluation of  value and growth stocks, which is more severe in the 
post-1990 period with greater valuation uncertainty.  
Second, premium to value REIT stocks is not due solely to size effect. The 
results of  size-adjusted returns show a strong value premium. Once again, the value 
premium of  size-adjusted returns is only significant in post-1990 period. The return 
spreads of  value and growth portfolio are still material and significant after adjusting 
for size effect, with 4.1%, 9.7% and 12.2% over the three holding periods.  
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Third, the premium of  value REIT stocks during post-1990 period tends to be 
comparable with those documented by Ali, Hwang and Trombley (2003) for 
common stocks between 1977 and 1997 (in particularly, they have reported a value 
premium of  8.9%, 21.6%, and 30.7% for one-, two- and three year holding periods, 
respectively, using evidence of  common stocks between 1977 and 1997.  
To further compare the value anomaly of  REIT market with that of  common 
stock market, Table 4.5 presents similar results for common stocks. Consistent with 
findings of  previous studies, the return spread of  value and growth common stocks 
is significant over the one, two, and three-year holding periods, for both the pre-1990 
and post-1990 periods. In essence, the return spread between value and growth 
common stocks in post-1990 period is 0.140, 0.281, and 0.548 for one, two, and 
three-year holding period, respectively, which is comparable to 0.085, 0.279, and 
0.487 for respective holding periods in REIT market. The only difference is that 
growth REIT portfolio (Q5) seems to have higher returns than Q2 and Q4, and 
there seems to be an asymmetric value effect in REIT market. Furthermore, the main 
source of  value anomaly in REIT returns is the higher average return of  value stocks, 
while growth stocks do not exhibit much lower returns. It is probably that growth 
REIT stocks in the post-1990 period are less overpriced; while the value REIT stocks 
are strongly underpriced. We will further test this hypothesis in Chapter 6. This 
asymmetric value effect only disappears when we adjust for size effect. As the 
size-adjusted returns for the three holding periods increase monotonously with B/M, 
with growth portfolio (Q5) having the lowest size-adjusted returns.  
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Table 4.5 Returns to Value and Growth Portfolios of  Common Stock  
Re1, Re2, and Re3 are the one-year, two-year, and three-year buy-and-hold return, respectively, 
beginning July of  year t. Statistical significance is reported for difference in the values of  Q1 
and Q5 portfolios, Q1-Q5 Diff. The t-statistic is computed as mean divided by standard 
error of  the annual estimates. To correct for serial correlation in returns induced by 
overlapping holding periods for return horizons greater than one year, we use the Newey and 
West (1987) corrected standard error of  the means. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 










Panel A: 1982- 2000       
Re1 0.203  0.173 0.158 0.126 0.073  0.141   0.129 *** 
Re2 0.389  0.377 0.348 0.277 0.102  0.311   0.287 *** 
Re3 0.625  0.595 0.551 0.431 0.148  0.490   0.477 *** 
        
Panel B: 1982-1990       
Re1 0.121  0.122 0.098 0.072 0.013  0.080  0.108 *** 
Re2 0.317  0.297 0.245 0.200 0.068  0.219  0.250 *** 
Re3 0.576  0.505 0.421 0.345 0.088  0.387  0.488 *** 
        
Panel C: 1991-2000       
Re1 0.238  0.214 0.206 0.169 0.098  0.189  0.140 *** 
Re2 0.514  0.441 0.431 0.339 0.233  0.384  0.281 *** 
Re3 0.744  0.668 0.655 0.500 0.196  0.572  0.548 *** 
Source: Kenneth R. French’s Data Library. 
 
Given the small sample size in the pre-1990 period, we divide the REITs in 
pre-1990 period into 3 instead of  5 portfolios based on their B/M, the result is 
presented in Table a.2 of  Appendix. The three-portfolio also suggests a similar 
pattern as Panel B of  Table 4.3, that no significant value anomaly exists in the 
pre-1990 period.  
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To confirm our results are not biased by including mortgage and hybrid REITs, 
Table a.3 of  Appendix further show the results by excluding those mortgage and 
hybrid REITs. Again, these five portfolios yield similar results as using all REITs.  
Besides using B/M ratio as the sorting variable to examine the value anomaly, we 
also employed dividend-price ratio to construct the portfolios. Table a.3 of  Appendix 
presents the results from using dividend-price ratio also shows similar retests. The 
results are similar with that of  using B/M, with slightly smaller return spread between 
value and growth portfolio during the post-1990 period. Also, there is no significant 
value anomaly before 1990. 
To further examine the time-varying patterns of  the value anomaly, the 3-year 
holding period return for the value portfolios (Q1) and growth portfolios (Q5) as 
well as their return spread over the 1982-2000 period are charted in Figure 4.1. 
Consistent with our earlier observations, the value anomaly as represented by the 
positive spread between the value and growth portfolios only came into existence 
after 1990. The figure clearly shows that prior to 1990, there was no evidence of  
systematic mispricing of  value and growth stocks in the REIT market. Prior to 1990, 
the growth portfolios outperformed the value portfolios in every year. But the 
situation reversed from 1990 onwards, with value portfolios outperforming growth 
portfolios in 10 of  the 11 years. In addition, this value effect persists during the 
post-1990 period, in contrast with the small-cap effect in common stocks, which has 
disappeared over the nineties.  
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Figure 4.1: Spread of  value premium in the REIT Market (1982-1990) 
This chart tracks the three-year buy-and-hold return for value (Q1) and growth (Q5) 
portfolios as well as the return spread between the value and growth (Q1-Q5) portfolios. The 
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Source: Compustat and CRSP database, with author’s calculation. 
 To further make an illustration of  the value and growth REIT stocks, and how 
they perform over the sample period, Table 4.6 presented four value and growth 
REITs, with their firm characteristics and annual returns traced over the sample 
period (from 1982 to 2000). MISSION WEST PROPERTIES and PARKWAY 
PROPERTIES are chosen as the examples for value REIT stocks, as they locate in 
the value portfolio for most of  years during the sample period. Similar, COUSINS 
PROPERTIES and HOST MARRIOTT CORP are chosen as the examples for 
growth REIT stocks as they mostly appear in the growth portfolio. Consistent with 
previous results, the two value stocks have higher B/M than the two growth stocks. 
Also the value stocks have lower market capitalization and leverage than growth 
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stocks. However, while value stocks have higher returns over the post-1990 period, 
the returns of  growth stocks do not show significant decrease over the post-1990 
period. This finding is consistent with the results in Table 4.4, suggesting that the 
value anomaly in REIT returns is mainly due to the higher returns of  value stocks 
rather than the lower returns of  growth stocks. Therefore, the value strategy in REIT 





Table 4.6 Examples of  Value and Growth REIT Stocks 
Four value and growth REITs are listed as examples, with their performance traced over the 19-year period (from 1982 to 2000). B/M is calculated as book equity in 
fiscal end year t-1 divided by market value of  equity at the end of  June of  year t. ME is market value of  equity in millions at the end of  June of  year t. Leverage is the 
long-term debt divided by common equity. Annual Return is the one-year holding period return beginning in July of  each year.  
 
Panel A: Value REIT Stocks 
Name MISSION WEST PROPERTIES  PARKWAY PROPERTIES  
Year B/M ME Leverage Annual Return  B/M ME Leverage Annual Return 
1982 1.54 10 - 0.739 1.00 11 0.18 -
1983 1.78 9 0.11 -0.031 1.02 23 0.30 0.299 
1984 1.05 15 0.09 -0.001 0.81 30 0.74 -0.017 
1985 1.24 14 0.30 0.479 0.95 29 0.64 0.082 
1986 1.36 14 0.23 0.217 0.99 39 0.25 -0.060 
1987 0.95 18 0.37 -0.239 1.11 35 0.07 -0.182 
1988 1.21 18 0.50 0.116 1.42 27 0.04 0.050 
1989 1.41 13 0.44 0.132 1.58 22 - -0.391 
1990 1.41 14 0.55 -0.048 3.38 11 0.74 -0.270 
1991 1.27 15 0.91 0.091 4.01 8 0.89 0.050 
1992 1.60 13 0.38 -0.668 4.26 7 1.06 0.998 
1993 1.38 14 1.85 0.375 2.18 12 0.93 0.308 
1994 4.01 4 2.24 0.318 1.76 19 0.73 0.359 
1995 2.73 6 1.30 0.230 1.32 31 0.68 0.519 
1996 1.84 7 2.01 1.236 1.05 65 0.78 0.783 
1997 1.53 9 - - 0.68 169 0.41 0.146 
1998 3.18 5 4.66 - 0.85 327 0.93 0.190 
1999 0.49 68 1.31 0.365 0.78 335 1.18 -0.017 
2000 0.56 179 1.86 0.222 0.84 299 0.83 0.244 
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Panel B: Growth REIT Stocks 
Name COUSINS PROPERTIES   HOST MARRIOTT CORP 
Year B/M ME Leverage Annual Return  B/M ME Leverage Annual Return 
1982 0.29 69 0.60 0.205  0.47 911 1.72 1.259 
1983 0.29 81 0.80 0.421  0.25 2075 1.71 -0.116 
1984 0.26 112 1.21 0.533  0.34 1747 1.65 0.394 
1985 0.27 150 0.68 0.468  0.28 2452 1.41 0.983 
1986 0.21 217 0.18 0.208  0.17 4919 1.68 0.055 
1987 0.28 257 0.08 0.218  0.19 5082 3.08 -0.251 
1988 0.37 304 0.11 0.054  0.23 3332 4.02 0.232 
1989 0.36 303 0.24 -0.108  0.18 3851 5.23 -0.355 
1990 0.42 256 0.30 -0.003  0.27 2161 8.73 -0.203 
1991 0.48 238 0.30 -0.138  0.24 1690 6.66 -0.076 
1992 0.57 199 0.00 0.487  0.31 1616 5.06 0.602 
1993 0.50 356 0.02 -0.007  0.23 2618 4.27 0.932 
1994 0.63 432 0.15 0.209  0.39 1467 3.24 0.104 
1995 0.55 497 0.28 0.167  0.43 1683 3.23 0.374 
1996 0.50 559 0.42 0.482  0.33 2532 2.35 0.370 
1997 0.37 811 0.59 0.129  0.31 3614 3.61 0.000 
1998 0.39 943 0.48 0.191  0.33 3637 4.33 -0.181 
1999 0.35 1086 0.66 0.196  0.49 2709 4.25 -0.134 
2000 0.35 1248 1.00 0.099  0.62 2064 4.73 0.448 
Source: Compustat and CRSP database, with author’s calculation. 
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4.4 Summary and Implications 
The results from examination of  value anomaly in REIT returns provides strong 
support that value strategy can produce significant high returns in the REIT market. 
In addition, the return superiority of  value strategy appears to increase with the 
investment horizon, the return difference between value and growth REITs is 8.5%, 
27.9%, and 48.7% over one-, two-, and three-year holding period, respectively. 
Moreover, value REIT stocks are not associated with higher leverage, and the value 
anomaly is significant after control for size effect, suggesting that superior returns of  
value stocks are not caused by their size effect.  
The significant value anomaly, however, exists only in the post-1990 period, 
while pre-1990 period show no evidence of  value anomaly. This is consistent with 
the argument that value anomaly is stronger in the market of  high valuation 
uncertainty. Nevertheless, the evidence is inconsistent the argument that value 
anomaly would be smaller in high growth market. To further investigate why value 
anomaly exists only during 1990s, and what causes the value anomaly in REIT 
returns, the following chapters will explicitly test the risk-based explanation and the 
extrapolation model in both the pre-1990 and post-1990 periods. Also there is some 
evidence that value anomaly is asymmetry in REIT market, and value premium main 
comes from higher returns on value stocks rather than lower returns of  growth 
stocks. Hence, we will further test the hypothesis that growth REIT stocks are more 
correctly priced relative to value stocks. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RISK ANALYSIS OF VALUE AND GROWTH REITS 
5.1 Introduction 
Proponents of  the risk-based explanation argue that the superior returns 
associated with value stocks are compensation for higher risks. After adjusting for 
risks, no abnormal return would be earned. To examine the validity of  this argument, 
we carried out several tests to determine whether value REIT stocks are 
fundamentally more risky than growth REIT stocks.  
Furthermore, Chen and Zhang (1998) suggest that risk spread between value 
and growth stocks would be smaller in a high-growth market, as value stocks would 
no be much riskier than growth stocks in such expanding market condition. Since 
REIT market experienced dramatic growth during 1990s period, we will additionally 
test the hypothesis that value stocks exhibit smaller risks in the post-1990 period.  
 
5.2 Examination of  Risk-Based Theory 
Given the significant value anomaly in REIT returns during post-1990 period, 
this section examines the risks of  value and growth REIT stocks in this period 
specifically. Table 5.1 presents the risk measures associated with the five portfolios 
constructed using the same B/M strategy over the post-1990 period. As a further 
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examination of  the risk of  value strategy based on B/M, the last column also 
calculates the difference in the risk measures between value and growth portfolios. 
This corresponds to the risks of  a trading strategy that buys value stocks and sells an 
equal dollar amount of  growth stocks. According to Gentry, Jones and Mayer (2004), 
if  there is a risk factor common to all REITs, this strategy should eliminate exposure 
to the industry factor. 
Consistent with our earlier observation, Panel A shows that the mean 
monthly-after-formation return for value stocks is higher than growth stocks (2.1% 
versus 1.3%, annualized as 25.2% and 15.6%, respectively), and the mean difference 
is significant at 1% level. Although the standard deviation of  returns for the value 
portfolio (4.2%) is slightly higher than the growth portfolio (3.3%), it cannot fully 
explain the superior returns on value stocks. This is because after adjustment for the 
size effect, the standard deviation for the value portfolio (0.63%) is marginally lower 
than the growth portfolio (0.68%).  
Three risk-adjusted return measures for the portfolios are also reported in Panel 
A of  Table 5.1. They are: Coefficient of  variation, which is simply the risk-adjusted 
return derived from dividing standard deviation by the portfolio return; Treynor ratio, 
which is the premium earned by the portfolio relative to its total risk, and Sharpe 
ratio, which is the premium earned by the portfolio relative to its systematic risk. 
Whilst the coefficient of  variation is smaller for the value portfolios, the data shows 
that the average risk-adjusted returns for the value portfolios are higher than the 
growth portfolios. Again, the difference is significant at 1% level.  
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The systematic risk from CAPM for the portfolios is reported in Panel B. 
Contrary to the risk-based explanation, the beta for the value portfolio (0.217) is 
lower than the beta of  the growth portfolio (0.265), but the difference is not 
significant. While the systematic risk for value and growth seem to be same, the 
risk-adjusted return is much higher for value portfolio than growth portfolio (1.47% 
per month versus 0.66% per month, annualized as 17.64% and 7.92%, respectively), 
and the mean difference is significant at 1% level.  
Panel C further presents the estimation results from Fama and French (1996) 
three-factor model. Risk-based theory has documented that factor loading on B/M 
factor (HML) captures the risk premium of  value stocks. Therefore, value portfolio is 
supposed to have higher loading on this factor. The results in REIT market, however, 
suggest that HML factor loading for the value and growth REIT portfolio is not 
significantly different. Furthermore, loading on value REIT portfolio (0.577) is even 
lower than the growth REIT portfolio (0.630), but the difference is not significant. 
Value portfolio has higher loading SMB factor, which might due to their small 
capitalization. Furthermore, risk-adjusted return from Fama-French three factor 
model is also larger for value than growth REIT portfolio, the difference is 0.8% per 
month (annualized as 9.6% per year), significant at 1% level.  
The insignificant risk spread between value and growth REIT stocks is 
consistent with the argument that value stocks would not be much riskier than 
growth stocks in an expanding market. To further examine this argument, the next 
section will examine the same risk measures of  value and growth REIT portfolio 
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over the pre-1990 period, and compare with those in post-1990 period.  
Moreover, the above results all suggest that value REITs portfolio is able to 
produce higher abnormal return but it is not systematically riskier than the growth 
portfolio. This is inconsistent with the efficient market hypothesis which suggests 
that abnormal profit could not persist as rational traders will take the arbitrage 
opportunity and quickly trade away the anomaly. To examine why the value anomaly 
can persistently exist in REIT market, Chapter 7 will test the effect of  arbitrage costs 
in the existence of  value anomaly.  
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Table 5.1: Return-Risk Profile of  Value and Growth REIT Portfolios during Post-1990 period 
For each year from 1991 to 2000, 36-monthly returns of  each portfolio beginning July of  year t are employed as dependent variable. RM is RM is value-weight return on all 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. SMB and HML are Fama and French size- and B/M-factors. The t-statistic presented in brackets is computed as mean divided by 








Panel A: Summary Statistics  
Means 0.021 0.012 0.012 0.010 0.013  0.008 *** 
Standard Deviation 0.042 0.035 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.009 * 
Std. Dev. of  Size-adj.  0.0063 0.0071 0.0074 0.0068 0.0064 -0.0001 
Coeff. of  Variation 2.120 2.982 2.766 3.097 2.447  -0.327 *** 
Sharpe Ratio 0.413 0.255 0.294 0.219 0.302  0.111 *** 
Treynor Ratio 0.067 0.044 0.038 0.020 0.046   0.021 *** 
Panel B: Market Risk (Beta): Ri-Rf  = αi + βi (RM-Rf) + ei                                                                                                      [1] 





































Panel C: Fama French: Ri-Rf  = αi +βi (RM-Rf) + si SMB + hi HML + ei                                                                                   [2] 










  0.008 *** 
(3.983) 
βi  0.372 ** 
(2.416) 
  0.423 *** 
(3.073) 
  0.459 *** 
(3.173) 
  0.573 *** 
(4.058) 




si   0.583 *** 
(2.967) 
  0.417 *** 
(2.844) 
 0.293 ** 
(2.179) 
  0.468 *** 
(3.035) 
  0.395 *** 
(2.836) 
 0.188 ** 
(2.036) 
hi   0.577 *** 
(2.495) 
  0.602 *** 
(3.099) 
 0.459 ** 
(2.486) 
  0.674 *** 
(3.492) 














5.3 Comparison of  Risk Spread in Two Periods 
Chen and Zhang (1998) suggest that risk spread between value and growth 
stocks would be smaller in a high-growth market, as value stocks would no be 
much riskier than growth stocks in such expanding market condition. Since REIT 
market experienced dramatic growth only after 1990, value REIT stocks would be 
much riskier than growth REIT stocks in pre-1990 period, and the risk spread 
between them would also be larger in pre-1990 period. 
Table 5.2 presents the same risk measures of  value and growth REIT 
portfolios over the pre-1990 period. Contrary with the observation in post-1990 
period, Panel A shows that value portfolio has lower mean monthly return than 
growth portfolio in pre-1990 period (0.9% per month versus 1.3%), which is 
annualized as 10.8% and 15.6%, respectively. The standard deviation is also higher 
for value portfolio than growth portfolio using both raw returns and size-adjusted 
returns. Panel A also reports the three risk-adjusted return measures for the 
portfolios as in post-1990 period. However, the pre-1990 period show a different 
pattern with post-1990 period. Whilst the average risk-adjusted returns for the 
value portfolio are lower than the growth portfolio, the volatility (as measured by 
the coefficient of  variation) is significantly larger for the value portfolios. Therefore, 
the results is consistent with the hypothesis, that risk spread between value and 
growth REIT stocks is larger in pre-1990 period, as the value portfolio exhibit 
much higher volatility before 1990.  
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Panel B and C of  Table 5.2 show the systematic risk measures during pre-1990 
period. Although value portfolio has smaller beta than growth portfolio in 
pre-1990 period, the factor loadings on size (SMB) and book-to-market (HML) are 
both larger for value portfolios. Essentially, the risk spread on HML factor for 
value and growth portfolios is much higher for the pre-1990 period than the 
post-1990 period. These results combined with the observations in Panel A further 
support the hypothesis that value stocks exhibit smaller risks in the post-1990 
period. However, the hypothesis that value stocks expose investors to higher risk is 
rejected, because the risk spread between the value and growth REIT stocks does 
not match with the return spread in the pre-1990 and post-1990 period.  
 
5.4 Summary 
Value REIT stocks outperform growth REIT stocks only in post-1990 period. 
However, inconsistent with the risk-based theory, value REIT stocks in post-1990 
period are not systematically riskier than growth REIT stocks. Furthermore, when 
no superior performance of  value REIT stocks is found in pre-1990 period, the 
risk spread between value and growth REIT stocks is even larger in this period. 
Therefore, we reject the hypothesis that superior returns associated with value 
stocks are compensated for higher risks. In the next chapter, we will examine the 
explanation based on investors’ naïve extrapolation, and test the hypothesis that 
value anomaly is caused by mispricing which is more severe in the market with 
greater valuation uncertainty. 
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Table 5.2: Return-Risk Profile of  Value and Growth REIT Portfolios during Pre-1990 period 
For each year from 1982 to 1992, 36-monthly returns of  each portfolio beginning July of  year t are employed as dependent variable. RM is RM is value-weight return on all 
NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks. SMB and HML are Fama and French size- and B/M-factors. The t-statistic presented in brackets is computed as mean divided by 









Panel A: Summary Statistics  
Means 0.009 0.011 0.012 0.014 0.013 -0.004 * 
Standard Deviation 0.058 0.042 0.041 0.045 0.053 0.005 * 
Std. Dev. of  Size-adj.  0.0041 0.0023 0.0029 0.0038 0.0034 0.0007 * 
Coeff. of  Variation 6.537  3.716  3.536  3.256  3.995   2.542 ** 
Sharpe Ratio 0.074  0.160  0.170  0.205  0.165  -0.091 * 
Treynor Ratio 0.007  0.014  0.018  0.014  0.011  -0.004 * 
Panel B: Market Risk (Beta): Ri-Rf  = αi + βi (RM-Rf) + ei                                                                                                      [1] 
αi -0.001 0.002 0.003  0.003 ** 0.002  -0.003 ** 
 (-0.337) (1.201) (1.134) (1.701) (0.577) (-1.857)  
βi   0.615 ***   0.493 ***   0.396 ***   0.639 ***   0.818 ***  -0.203 *** 
 (10.033) (9.620) (9.795) (17.897) (21.291) (-4.669) 














Panel C: Fama French: Ri-Rf  = αi +βi (RM-Rf) + si SMB + hi HML + ei                                                                                   [2] 
αi -0.002 0.001  0.002 *   0.004 ***  0.004 *   -0.057 *** 
 (-0.732) (0.551) (1.527) (2.744) (1.399) (-3.480) 
βi   0.623 ***   0.540 ***   0.452 ***   0.668 ***   0.762 ***   -0.139 *** 
 (13.354) (13.658) (15.362) (14.400) (29.026) (-2.822) 
si   0.852 ***   0.492 ***   0.617 ***   0.571 ***   0.705 ***  0.147 * 
 (4.532) (4.061) (7.618) (5.773) (6.297) (1.323) 
hi   0.494 ***   0.415 ***   0.436 ***   0.329 *** 0.106   0.388 *** 
 (10.916) (5.326) (4.741) (6.693) (1.184) (2.496) 




Source: Author’s calculation 
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CHAPTER SIX 
EXTRAPOLATION MODEL AND 
VALUATION UNCERTAINTY 
6.1 Introduction 
So far, the empirical results have indicated that value REIT stocks exhibit 
superior returns and that the risk-based argument cannot adequately explain the 
superior returns. Therefore, we now move to the mispricing theory and examine the 
role of  expectational errors. In essence, Lakonishok, et al. (1994) suggests that 
investors are excessively optimistic about growth stocks and tend to overvalue them. 
Conversely, they are excessively pessimistic about value stocks and tend to undervalue 
them. To examine the validity of  the extrapolation theory to explain possible 
mispricing of  value and growth REIT stocks, we carry out three related tests as 
described earlier in Chapter 3.  
Moreover, it has been suggested that mispricing would be stronger in the market 
with higher valuation uncertainty. To test this argument, we would first compare the 
valuation uncertainty in the two periods, and then extrapolation model is also tested 
over the pre-1990 period. The hypothesis is that if  value anomaly is caused by 
expectational errors, no such errors would be observed in pre-1990 period, because 
valuation of  REIT is straightforward before 1990.  
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6.2 Extrapolation Model in Post-1990 Period 
6.2.1 Expected versus Future Growth Rates 
As a direct test of  the extrapolation model, we also compare the actual future 
growth rate of  the respective portfolios to their past and expected growth rate (as 
implied in their valuation multiples). The valuation multiples are represented by the 
REITs’ dividend yield and the Funds from Operations (FFO)-price ratio. The implied 
expected growth rate is calculated by assuming the pay-out rate as 75%, and the 
required rate of  return as 15%. 
 Table 6.1 presents the expected growth rates as well as past and actual future 
growth rates of  the REIT portfolios. As shown in Panel A, value REIT stocks have 
higher dividend yield and lower FFO multiple than growth stocks. The average 
dividend yield for value and growth portfolio is 9.8% and 8.0%, respectively. Similarly, 
the average FFO multiple for REIT stocks in the value portfolio is 6.8 times (1/14.7) 
as compared to 10.5 (1/0.095) times for REIT stocks in the growth portfolio. 
Assuming a 75% pay-out ratio and 15% required rate of  return, the implied expected 
growth rate is 5.2% and 4.0% per year for value portfolio, while 7.0% and 7.9% per 
year for growth portfolio. In addition, the difference in expected growth between 
value and growth portfolio is significant at 1% and 5% level.  
Panel B shows that, prior to portfolio formation, the dividend and FFO of  
growth stocks indeed grew faster than value stocks. As highlighted by Lakonishok, 
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Shleifer, and Vishny (1994), the difference in FFO multiple and dividend yield 
between the value and growth portfolios suggests that the market was expecting 
these growth differences to persist for many years. 
Panel C, however, reveals that the market’s expectation did not materialize. Over 
the first three years after portfolio formation, dividends received on the growth 
REIT portfolio grew by only 3.3% (as compared to a 12.1% growth rate prior to the 
portfolio formation). Conversely, the growth rate of  value REIT stocks increased 
from -7.7% before portfolio formation to 24.8% two year after portfolio formation. 
The data based on the actual future growth rates of  FFO tells a similar story. With 
the only exception in that the actual future growth rate of  FFO for growth portfolio 
(6.5%) does not disappoint the market’s expectation (7.9%) much. While the actual 
future growth rate of  FFO for value portfolio (8.6%) evidently exceeds the market’s 
expectation (4.0%). Therefore, consistent with the findings in Chapter 4 that most of  
the value anomaly is due to the higher returns of  value REIT stocks, the results here 
suggest that investor’s naïve extrapolation is more severe for value REIT portfolio 
than growth REIT portfolio. 
Furthermore, we notice that the post formation growth rate of  value REIT 
portfolio relative to the growth portfolio is most significant in the second year after 
its formation. In particular, the difference in the dividend growth rate between the 
value and growth portfolio is 18.7% in the second year, as compared to only 5.4% in 
the first year and 7.9% in the third year. This indicates that expectational errors upon 
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value and growth REIT stocks is most severe is the second year after portfolio 
formation. 
In conclusion, the results are consistent with the findings of  Lakonishok, 
Shleifer, and Wishny (1994), that superior post formation return on value stocks are 
associated with mispricing of  REIT stocks caused by a naïve extrapolation of  past 













Table 6.1 Expected and Actual Growth Rates in Post-1990 Period 
D/P is the ratio of  dividends per share to stock price, whilst FFO/P is the ratio of  funds from 
operation per share to stock price. The ratios are calculated based on the accounting figures one 
year before portfolio formation (year t-1) and stock price as of  end-June. The Expected Growth 
Rate is calculated by assuming the payout ratio as 75%, and the required rate of  return as 15%. 
ADG (i,j) AFG(i,j) is the average annual growth rate of  dividends and FFO, respectively, for the 
portfolio from year i to year j. The sample period is from 1991 to 2001. The t-statistic is 
computed as mean divided by standard error of  the annual estimates. ***, **, and * indicate 








Panel A: Fundamental Variables 
D/P 0.098 0.083 0.077 0.082 0.080 0.018** 
Expected Growth Rate 0.052 0.067 0.073 0.068 0.070 -0.018 ** 
FFO/P 0.147 0.108 0.106 0.098 0.095  0.052*** 
Expected Growth Rate 0.040  0.069 0.071 0.077 0.079   -0.039 ***
Panel B: Past Growth Rate 
ADG (-3,0) -0.077 0.090 0.066 0.106 0.121 -0.198** 
AFG(-3,0) 0.040 0.116 0.160 0.171 0.146 -0.106*** 
Panel C: Actual Future Growth Rate 
ADG (0,3) 0.122  0.047 0.007 0.008 0.033   0.089 ** 
AFG(0,3) 0.086 0.076 0.063 0.073 0.065 0.021* 
First year after formation      
ADG (0,1) 0.124  0.036 0.053 0.019 0.076  0.054 ** 
AFG(0,1) 0.092 0.056 0.061 0.097 0.088 0.004 * 
Second year after formation      
ADG (1,2) 0.200  0.078 -0.012 0.004 0.013  0.187***
AFG(1,2) 0.121 0.112 0.104 0.062 0.054 0.067** 
Third year after formation      
ADG (2,3) 0.105  0.035 -0.026 0.004 0.026  0.079 
AFG(2,3) 0.073 0.028 0.013 0.058 0.047 0.036 




6.2.2 Market Reaction to Earnings Announcements 
Extrapolation theory posits that if  investors in growth/value stocks become 
aware of  their expectational errors through subsequent earnings announcements, 
therefore market reactions to the quarterly earnings announcements should be more 
positive for the value portfolios as compared to growth portfolios.  
In this section, we examine whether earnings surprises in the five years after 
portfolios formation are systematically positive for value REIT stocks and negative 
for growth REIT stocks as prescribed by the extrapolation theory. Table 6.2 reports 
the returns over a 3-day window (-1, +1) around the quarterly earnings 
announcement date for value and growth REIT portfolios. In addition, the results are 
aggregated into annual intervals by summing up the four quarterly earnings 
announcement returns in each of  the five post formation years (see La Porta et al., 
1997). 
As anticipated, the results indicate that market reactions to quarterly earnings 
announcement are more positive for the value REIT portfolios. In the first year after 
portfolio formation, cumulative event returns for the growth and value portfolios are 
1.96% and 2.12%, respectively. The differences in the earnings announcement price 
response become most significant from the second year. For example, the cumulative 
event returns in year +2 (Q05-Q08) for value REIT stocks are 2.44%, whilst growth 
REIT stocks only gain 1.24%. The difference of  portfolio event return for year +2 is 
1.20%. While the event returns of  value REIT portfolio are somewhat comparable 
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with that of  La Porta, et al. (1997) (which find an event return of  3.5% and 3.0% for 
value portfolio in year +1 and year +2, respectively), the event returns of  growth 
REIT portfolio are much larger (1.96% and 1.24% for year +1 and year +2, 
respectively). As La Porta, et al. (1997)’s results suggest that growth portfolio has a 
negative event return of  -0.47% and -0.43% for year +1 and year +2, respectively. 
Therefore, this provide further evidence to support our hypothesis that growth REIT 
stocks are correctly priced, as they do not exhibit negative earnings surprises.  
The results also show that the magnitude and significance of  superior event 
return for the value portfolio over growth portfolio is largest in year +2, then 
diminishes from third year after portfolio formation, and becomes only significant at 
10% level in the fifth year. The size-adjusted event returns tell a similar story, except 
that the effects fade off  in Year +5 as similarly observed by La Porta et al (1997). 
Overall, the evidence indicates a similar pattern with the results drawn from growth 
rates, that expectational error is most severe in the second year after portfolios 







Table 6.2 Market Reaction to Earnings Announcements in Post-1990 Period 
The table reports equal-weighted earnings announcement returns for each portfolio. These are 
measured quarterly over a 3-day window (-1, +1) around the COMPUSTAT Industry Quarterly 
data file. The earnings announcement returns are then summed up over the four quarters in each 
of  the first four post-formation years (Q01-Q04…, Q13-Q16). The sample period is from 1991 
to 2001. The t-statistic in parentheses is computed as mean divided by standard error of  the 
annual estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at better than the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
Post-1990s Period Value Growth Mean  Difference 
Panel A: Raw Return 
Q01-Q04   2.12%**    1.96%***    0.16%* 
Q05-Q08    2.44%***      1.24%***      1.20%*** 
Q09-Q12    2.48%***      1.64%***     0.84%** 
Q13-Q16    2.24%***      1.56%***  0.68%** 
Q17-Q20   2.23%***   1.52%** 0.71%* 
Panel B: Size-Adjusted Return 
Q01-Q04 1.01%  0.84%* 0.17%* 
Q05-Q08   1.75%***   0.95%**   0.79%*** 
Q09-Q12   1.86%***  0.58%   1.28%*** 
Q13-Q16   1.53%***  0.63%   0.90%** 
Q17-Q20   1.48%***     1.30%** 0.18% 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
6.2.3 Pre- & post-formation performance 
Finally, as Fama and French (1995) argued that if  the low post-formation returns 
of  low B/M stocks are due to incorrect extrapolation of  strong past earnings growth, 
the low returns should be temporary. Similarly, the high average returns on high B/M 
stocks would last for only several years. 
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In this test, we trace the performance of  our REIT portfolios over an eight-year 
horizon (three years before portfolio formation plus five years after formation). 
According to the extrapolation theory, the value REIT portfolios (Q1) should register 
poor pre-formation returns but superior post-formation performance. Conversely, 
growth REIT stocks should produce higher returns prior to portfolio formation but 
inferior returns thereafter. In addition, the return difference between value and 
growth stocks will gradually decrease in the past formation period, as investors 
correct their expectational error.  
The results presented in Table 6.3 are consistent with this prediction. It can be 
observed that the performance of  growth REIT stocks lagged behind value stocks 
after the portfolio construction. We also observe that the superior performance of  
value portfolio is strongest in the second year after portfolio construction (14.5%). 
From then on, the superior performance of  value REIT stocks gradually decreases to 
10.6 % in Year 3 and 7.6% in Year 4. The return differential between value and 
growth portfolios becomes slightly significant by the fourth year and insignificant by 
the fifth year after formation. This reflects the length of  4 to 5 years taken for the 





Table 6.3 Pre- and Post-formation Returns of  Value and Growth Portfolios in Post-1990 
Period 
For each portfolio described above, we calculate its ith year return, Ret(i). The return difference 
between the value and glamour portfolio Q1-Q5 Diff  is also calculated. Sample period is from 
1991 to 1998. The t-statistic is computed as mean divided by standard error of  the annual 









A. Pre-formation Returns      
Ret(-3) 0.158 0.129 0.141 0.150 0.217 -0.060 
Ret(-2) 0.119 0.091 0.126 0.132 0.220 -0.101 
Ret(-1) 0.084 0.139 0.157 0.124 0.203 -0.119 
B. Post-formation Returns      
Ret(1) 0.243 0.138 0.177 0.143 0.158  0.085** 
Ret(2) 0.320 0.150 0.162 0.151 0.175   0.145***
Ret(3) 0.255 0.148 0.144 0.100 0.149   0.106***
Ret(4) 0.215 0.135 0.187 0.129 0.138  0.076* 
Ret(5) 0.185 0.171 0.159 0.131 0.144 0.041 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
6.3 Further Examination of  Valuation Uncertainty 
The above examination of  extrapolation model gives a good explanation to the 
value anomaly in post-1990 period. To further examine the hypothesis that value 
anomaly in REIT returns during 1990s is caused by higher valuation uncertainty and 
no expectational errors exists in pre-1990 period, we conduct two additional tests in 
the next sections. First, to confirm the argument that valuation uncertainty is higher 
in post-1990 period, we examine the changes in volatility of  Funds from Operations 
(FFO) and Dividend during the two periods, with the hypothesis that there is higher 
volatility of  FFO and Dividend in the post-1990 period. Second, we repeat the test 
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of  extrapolation model with the pre-1990 period, to examine the hypothesis that no 
evidence of  expectational error would be observed in this period.  
 
6.3.1 Change of  Valuation Uncertainty 
Similar with Chui, Titman, and Wei (2003)b, we use Coefficient of  Variation (CV) 
of  FFO and Dividend per share to measure the valuation uncertainty. Table 6.4 
reports the volatility of  FFO and Dividend of  REITs in pre-1990 and post-1990 
period. Consistent with Ling and Ryngaert (1997) and Chui, Titman, and Wei (2003)b, 
we find that the average volatility of  FFO and Dividend is much larger in the 
post-1990 period than in the pre-1990 period, with a significant change in mean 
volatility of  0.460 and 0.417, respectively. Median volatility shows a similar pattern; 
suggest that the change of  volatility is not caused by extreme observations.  
 
Table 6.4 Change of  Valuation Uncertainty in Two Periods 
For each REIT, Coefficient of  Variation (CV) of  FFO and Dividend per share, are calculated for 
both pre-1990 and post-1990 periods. Mean and median of  the CV are presented for each period, 
with the differences presented in the last column. The t-statistic is computed as mean divided by 
standard error of  the annual estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at better than the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 Pre-1990s Post-1990s Change 
Mean CV of  FFO 0.412 0.872 0.460 *** 
Median CV of  FFO 0.213 0.732 0.521 *** 
    
Mean CV of  Dividend 0.346 0.763 0.417 *** 
Median CV of  Dividend 0.265 0.604 0.339 ** 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
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6.3.2 Extrapolation Model in Pre-1990 Period 
Under the hypothesis that no evidence of  expectational error would be observed 
in pre-1990 period, the future growth rates of  value and growth portfolios would be 
similar with their expectations. Moreover, value portfolio would not have more 
positive earnings surprise than growth portfolio.  
Table 6.5 presents the expected growth rates and the actual growth rates of  
value and growth portfolios over the pre-1990 period. Value portfolio has lower past 
growth rate and expected growth rate then growth portfolios, which is similar with 
the post-1990 period. However, the actual future growth rates of  value and growth 
portfolios in pre-1990 period tend to consistent with the market’s expectations. In 
essence, value portfolio consistently has lower future growth rate than growth 
portfolio. Thus, it was more straightforward to value a REIT before 1990, with less 
probability to make expectational errors.  
Table 6.6 further presents the market reaction to earnings announcements of  
value and growth portfolio over the pre-1990 period. Consistent with the hypothesis, 
market reaction is not significant higher for value portfolio than for growth portfolio. 
Instead, growth portfolio even enjoys significantly higher earnings surprise in the 
second and third years. This may due to the higher future growth rate of  growth 
portfolio. The findings combined with the results from Table 6.5 suggest that the 
insignificant value anomaly in pre-1990 period is mainly due to the straightforward 
valuation of  REIT before 1990.  
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Table 6.5 Expected and Actual Growth Rates in Pre-1990 Period 
D/P is the ratio of  dividends per share to stock price, whilst FFO/P is the ratio of  funds from 
operation per share to stock price. The ratios are calculated based on the accounting figures one 
year before portfolio formation (year t-1) and stock price as of  end-June. The Expected Growth 
Rate is calculated by assuming the payout ratio as 75%, and the required rate of  return as 15%. 
ADG (i,j) AFG(i,j) is the average annual growth rate of  dividends and FFO, respectively, for the 
portfolio from year i to year j. The sample period is from 1982 to 1990. The t-statistic is 
computed as mean divided by standard error of  the annual estimates. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at better than the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Pre-1990s Period Q1 
(Value) 




Panel A: Fundamental Variables 
D/P 0.084  0.083 0.079 0.067 0.065   0.019 ** 
Expected Growth Rate 0.066 0.067 0.071 0.083 0.085 -0.019 ** 
FFO/P 0.103  0.101 0.097 0.086 0.079   0.024 ** 
Expected Growth Rate 0.073  0.074 0.077 0.086 0.091  -0.018 ** 
Panel B: Past Growth Rate 
ADG (-3,0) -0.023 0.003 0.015 0.042 0.031 -0.054 ** 
AFG(-3,0) -0.001 0.008 0.025 0.014 0.038  -0.039 ***
Panel C: Actual Future Growth Rate 
ADG (0,3) -0.012 -0.007 0.004 0.017 0.013  -0.025 ***
AFG(0,3) 0.003 0.012 0.010 0.027 0.018  -0.056 ***
First year after formation      
ADG (0,1) -0.018 -0.009 -0.001 0.018 0.016 -0.034 ***
AFG(0,1) -0.002 0.011 0.014 0.019 0.009 -0.069 ***
Second year after formation      
ADG (1,2) 0.002 -0.001 0.016 0.021 0.019 -0.017 ** 
AFG(1,2) 0.013 0.004 0.003 0.021 0.017 -0.044 ** 
Third year after formation      
ADG (2,3) -0.010 -0.017 0.002 0.007 0.003 -0.013 ** 
AFG(2,3) -0.004 0.025 0.018 0.035 0.024 -0.050 ***





Table 6.6 Market Reaction to Earnings Announcements in Pre-1990 Period 
The table reports equal-weighted earnings announcement returns for each portfolio. These are 
measured quarterly over a 3-day window (-1, +1) around the COMPUSTAT Industry Quarterly 
data file. The earnings announcement returns are then summed up over the four quarters in each 
of  the first four post-formation years (Q01-Q04…, Q13-Q16). The sample period is from 1982 
to 1990. The t-statistic in parentheses is computed as mean divided by standard error of  the 
annual estimates. ***, **, and * indicate significance at better than the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Pre-1990s Period Value Growth Mean  Difference 
Panel A: Raw Return 
Q01-Q04  0.45% * 0.33% 0.12% 
Q05-Q08 0.09% 0.35%  -0.26% * 
Q09-Q12 0.20% 0.65% *   -0.45% ** 
Q13-Q16 0.30% 0.46% * -0.16% 
Q17-Q20 0.49% 0.52% -0.03% 
Panel B: Size-Adjusted Return 
Q01-Q04 0.22% 0.14% 0.08%  
Q05-Q08 -0.10% 0.21%  -0.31% * 
Q09-Q12 0.15% 0.38%   -0.23% ** 
Q13-Q16 0.18% 0.29% -0.11% 
Q17-Q20 0.23% 0.34% -0.11% 







This chapter examines the source of  value anomaly in REIT returns through the 
extrapolation model and valuation uncertainty. The results show evidence of  
expectational errors in post-1990 period, which properly explains the source of  value 
premium. In addition, we find that the extrapolation is asymmetric and expectational 
error is more severe for value REIT stocks. This is consistent with the observation in 
Chapter 4 that value anomaly is mainly due to the higher return of  value REIT 
stocks.  
Moreover, we find no evidence of  expectational error in pre-1990 period, when 
there is less valuation uncertainty. Therefore, mispricing is main reason for the 
existence of  value anomaly in REIT returns, and the insignificant value anomaly in 





The previous chapters have found that value anomaly in REIT market is not due 
to systematic risks. Instead, it is investors’ naïve extrapolation that causes the value 
anomaly. And the expectational error exists only in post-1990 period, when the 
valuation uncertainty of  REIT market is higher. Since value anomaly is caused by 
mispricing due to systematic bias in expectations, then why do not rational traders 
exploit this opportunity and quickly eliminate the mispricing? 
The behavioral theory suggests that mispricing can still exist in the presence of  
rational traders, because arbitrage costs prevent the rational traders from taking full 
advantage of  mispricing. For example, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Ali, Hwang, 
and Trombley (2003) argue idiosyncratic risk, transaction costs, and investor 
sophistications are all important factors of  arbitrage costs which deter the 
arbitrageurs to trade away the value effect. This chapter would specifically test the 
validity of  the arbitrage cost theory, and see which factors have significant 
relationship with the existence of  value anomaly in REIT returns.  
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7.2 Arbitrage Costs in Existence of  Value Anomaly 
To determine the incremental role of  these arbitrage costs in the existence of  
value effect, we carry out the multiple regression tests as below:  
1
0 1 2 3 4
1
5 6 7 8
Re3 / / * / *
/ * ( ) ( )
b b Beta b B M b B M Ivolatility b B M Price
b B M D analyst b Ivolatility b Price b Ln ME e
−
−
= + + + +
+ + + + +    [3] 
where Re3 is the buy-and-hold return over 36 month beginning in July of  year t. 
Ivolatility is square root of  residual variance derived from the regression of  monthly 
returns on a value-weighted market index over 36 months ending on June of  year t. 
Price is the closing price of  a REIT stock at end of  June of  year t. DAnalysts is a 
dummy variable which takes the value of  1 if  a REIT is covered by I/B/E/S, and 
value of  0 if  not. ME is the market value of  equity in millions of  dollars at the end 
of  June of  year t.  
Following the Fama and MacBeth (1973)’s procedure, Equation [3] is estimated every 
year from 1991 to 2000, and means of  the annual estimates are reported. The 
coefficients on the interaction terms in Equation [3] capture how the B/M effect 
varies cross-sectionally with the arbitrage cost measures. According to Ali, Hwang, 
and Trombley (2003), all the arbitrage costs measures are also included by themselves 
to keep the unbiased coefficient of  the interaction terms. The model also 
incorporates beta of  individual REIT to control the effect of  systematic risk. To 
keep consistent signs of  the coefficients on all the interaction terms, Ivolatility is 
included into the equation in its reverse. Firm size (ME) is included in the model 
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with log transformation because of  the distributional properties of  these variables 
(Brennan et al., 1993).   
Table 7.1 presents the descriptive statistics of  the variables. Over the sample 
period, there are substantial cross-sectional variations of  these variables, which are 
shown by their high standard deviations relative to their means. The mean of  
DAnalysts is 0.441, which suggests that over half  of  the REITs in our sample are not 
covered by analysts. In addition, the mean for Ivolatility, Price, and beta is 0.072, 20.6, 
and 0.280, respectively. The mean for B/M, ME, and Re3 is 0.910, 485, and 58.7%, 
respectively.  
 
Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics of  Variables (1991-2000) 
DAnalysts is a dummy variable which takes the value of  1 if  a REIT is covered by I/B/E/S, and 
value of  0 if  not. Ivolatility is square root of  residual variance derived from the regression of  
monthly returns on a value-weighted market index over 36 months ending on June of  year t. ME 
is the market value of  equity in millions of  dollars at the end of  June of  year t. Price is the closing 
price of  a REIT stock at end of  June of  year t. For each year, we calculate the mean, median and 
standard deviation of  the variables, and the numbers are then averaged across the sample period.  
DAnalysts Ivolatility B/M ME Price Beta Re3 
Mean 0.441 0.072 0.910 485 20.6 0.280 0.587 
Median 0.400 0.061 0.731 266 17.4 0.256 0.521 
Stdev. 0.463 0.043 0.904 629 22.8 0.460 0.908 
 




Table 7.2 reports the correlation matrix of  these arbitrage cost measures. Overall, 
the correlations between the arbitrage cost measures are reasonably low. In particular, 
Ln(ME) is only moderately correlated with the other three measures (0.371 with 
DAnalysts, -0.324 with Ivolatility, and 0.296 with Price) . The correlations between the 
Ivolatility, Price, and Analyst are all less than 0.3. Thus, it indicates that the four 
variables are capturing different aspects of  arbitrage cost.  
 
Table 7.2 Correlations among Arbitrage Cost Measures 
DAnalysts is a dummy variable which takes the value of  1 if  a REIT is covered by I/B/E/S, and 
value of  0 if  not. Ivolatility is square root of  residual variance derived from the regression of  
monthly returns on a value-weighted market index over 36 months ending on June of  year t. ME 
is the market value of  equity in millions of  dollars at the end of  June of  year t. Price is the closing 
price of  a REIT stock at end of  June of  year t. Pairwise correlation coefficients are calculated 
each year from 1991 to 2000, and mean of  the annual correlation coefficients are reported.  
 
Variable DAnalysts Ivolatility Ln (ME) Price 
DAnalysts 1.000    
Ivolatility -0.259 1.000   
Ln (ME) 0.371 -0.324 1.000  
Price 0.094 -0.066 0.296 1.000 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
 
Table 7.3 reports the regressions estimates based on the above equation. Column 
1 and 2 also presents two reduced version of  Equation [1]. The first column shows 
results from using Beta and B/M as explanatory variables. The mean slope coefficient 
on Beta is positive but insignificantly different from zero. This is consistent with 
findings of  studies on REIT market (e.g., Chan, et al., 1990; Mei, 1999), that beta has 
little direct impact on individual REIT returns. The mean value of  coefficient for 
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B/M (0.340) is positive and significant at 1% level, consistent with findings from 
previous portfolio results that value effect significantly exists in REIT market.  
The second column reports results of  a model with beta, B/M, Ivolatility and its 
interaction term with B/M. Coefficients on beta and B/M remain their sign and 
significance. Coefficient on B/M*Ivolatility-1 is significant negative (-0.435), similar 
with Ali, Hwang, and Trombley (2003), this result suggests that the B/M based value 
effect increases with the idiosyncratic risk. The third column further presents the 
results using all variables in Equation [1]. The coefficient on B/M*Ivolatility-1 is still 
significantly negative (-0.330). In addition, other measures of  arbitrage cost do not 
have significant explanatory power for value effect in the presence of  idiosyncratic 
risk. Therefore, the idiosyncratic risk plays the most important role in the existence 









Table 7.3 Regression Tests of  Arbitrage Costs in Existence of  Value Anomaly 
The dependent variable is Re3, three-year buy-and-hold return, beginning in July of  year t. Beta is 
systematic risk estimated using 36 monthly returns end in June of  year t. B/M is book value per 
share year t-1 divided by market value of  equity at end of  June of  year t. DAnalysts is a dummy 
variable which takes the value 1 if  a REIT is covered by I/B/E/S, and value 0 if  not. Ivolatility is 
square root of  residual variance derived from the regression of  monthly returns on a 
value-weighted market index over 36 months ending on June of  year t. ME is the market value of  
equity in millions of  dollars at the end of  June of  year t. Price is the closing price of  a REIT stock 
at end of  June of  year t. Regression models are estimated for each year from 1991 to 2000, and 
means of  annual estimates are reported. The t-statistics is computed as mean divided by standard 
error of  the annual estimates. The sample period is from 1991-2000. To correct for serial 
correlation in returns induced by overlapping holding periods, we use the Newey and West (1987) 
procedures to estimate standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept  0.212 ** 0.065 0.348 
 (1.945) (0.157) (0.981) 
Beta 0.359 0.321 0.373 
 (0.970) (0.877) (1.079) 
B/M   0.340 ***   0.903 ***   0.959 ** 
 (5.245) (2.392) (2.397) 
B/M*Ivolatility-1(*10-1)  -0.435 **  -0.330 ** 
  (-1.854) (-1.810) 
B/M*Ln(ME)   -0.068 
   (-0.777) 
B/M*Price*10-1   -0.081 
   (-1.195) 
B/M*DAnalysts   -0.140 
   (-0.504) 
Ivolatility-1(*10-1)  0.143 0.128 
  (0.753) (0.733) 
Price   -0.022 
   (-0.526) 
DAnalysts   -0.011 
   (-0.239) 
Ln(ME)   0.125 
   (0.668) 
Average Adj. R2 0.111  0.145 0.209 
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
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7.3 Idiosyncratic Risk in Value and Growth Portfolios 
Given the importance of  idiosyncratic risk in explaining the value anomaly, we 
examine this risk in value and growth portfolios specifically. Table 7.4 shows the 
Ivolatility of  the corresponding portfolios, both from CAPM and Fama-French’s 
three-factor model. The results suggest that the idiosyncratic risk decreases 
monotonically with the B/M ratio. Furthermore, the idiosyncratic risk for value 
stocks (3.92% from CAPM and 3.4% from Fama-French’s Model) is significantly 
higher than growth stocks (3.00% and 2.5%, respectively) at 1% level. It is also 
worthwhile to notice that the idiosyncratic risk is less severe for growth REIT stocks, 
and as a result, they are less prone to mispricing as compared to value stocks. The 
results are consistent with the finding in Chapter 4 and 6, that value anomaly in REIT 
market is mainly caused by the mispricing of  value REIT stocks, while growth REIT 
stocks are correctly priced. Furthermore, the higher idiosyncratic risk associated with 
value portfolios deters arbitrage activity on these underpriced REITs, and is an 
important reason for the existence of  value anomaly.  
This observation can also be combined with the results of  Chaudhry, 
Maheshwari, and Webb (2004). The authors find that idiosyncratic risk of  REITs is 
significantly related with their performance and earnings variability. This is consistent 
with the definition of  value and growth stocks, as value stocks tend to have low 
performance and unstable earnings relative to growth stocks.  
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Table 7.4 Idiosyncratic Risk for Value and Growth Portfolios 
For each year from 1991 to 2000, Ivolatility is calculated as the square root of  residual variance 
derived from the regression of  36 monthly returns of  each portfolio beginning July of  year t, on 
a value-weighted market index and Fama and French (1996)’s three factors. The t-statistic is 
computed as mean divided by standard error of  the annual estimates. ***, **, and * indicate 









CAPM 0.039 0.033 0.031 0.031 0.030  0.009 *** 
Fama-French 0.034  0.028 0.028 0.026 0.025   0.009 ***  
 
Source: Author’s Calculation 
 
7.4 Summary 
This Chapter examines the existence of  value anomaly from the perspective of  
arbitrage costs. We identify several arbitrage cost measures and examine their 
relationship with value anomaly in REIT returns. Consistent with previous findings 
in common stocks as Ali, Hwang, and Trombley, (2003), we find that idiosyncratic 
risk is the only significant factor on value anomaly. Moreover, the results suggest that 
value portfolio has the highest idiosyncratic risk than any other portfolios. Therefore, 
the higher idiosyncratic risk associated with value portfolios deters arbitrage activity 
on these underpriced REITs, and is an important reason for the existence of  value 
anomaly. Moreover, this result is consistent with our hypothesis that mispricing of  
value REIT stocks is more severe than growth REIT stocks, and is the main source 





8.1 Summary of  Main Findings 
Value anomaly is an important pattern in stock returns. This anomaly is 
examined in REIT returns, to further the understanding on the pricing and return 
pattern of  the value and growth REIT stocks, because the value strategy involves 
long-term holding periods of  up to five years. However, studies on the anomalies of  
REIT returns have so far drawn evidence from a short- or media-term perspective 
(up to 6-month), while the long-term (holding periods longer than one year) return 
behavior of  the REIT is mostly ignored. Examining value anomaly in REIT returns 
over long-term holding periods will therefore contribute to the knowledge gap.  
Furthermore, there have been dramatic growth and higher valuation uncertainty in 
the REIT market during 1990s, which provides a good setting to examine the value 
anomaly from two explanations.  
This study provides a better understanding of  the value anomaly in REIT 
returns. In particular, we find significant value anomaly in the REIT market, but the 
value anomaly is only significant in the post-1990 period, while no evidence of  value 
anomaly is found in the pre-1990 period. In addition, we notice that value anomaly in 
REIT returns is mainly due to the higher returns of  value REIT stocks, while growth 
REIT stocks do not exhibit much lower returns. We also examine the effect of  firm 
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size and leverage in two periods and find that value anomaly is not solely due to these 
firm characteristics.  
To examine what causes the significant value anomaly in post-1990 period, and 
why there is no such anomaly in pre-1990 period, we examine two different 
explanations. 
First, we examine the risk-based explanation of  value anomaly and find that 
value REIT stocks are not exposed to higher systematic risk than the growth stocks. 
Moreover, there is a smaller risk spread between value and growth in the post-1990 
period than in the pre-1990 period, while there is a higher return spread in the 
post-1990 period. Therefore, the value anomaly in REIT returns is not caused by 
systematic risk.  
Second, we examine the investors’ expectational errors based on the 
extrapolation model, and we find that investors’ naïve extrapolation causes the value 
anomaly in post-1990 period. In addition, we find that the extrapolation is 
asymmetric and the expectational error is more severe for the value REIT stocks. 
This is consistent with the observation in the return spread between the value and 
the growth REIT stocks, and the value anomaly is mainly owing to the higher return 
of  the value REIT stocks.  
In addition, as there is less valuation uncertainty in pre-1990 period, no evidence 
of  expectational error is found in value and growth REITs before 1990. Hence, we 
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conclude that it was the higher valuation uncertainty in the post-1990 period that 
caused the mispricing of  the REIT market, especially the value REIT stocks. While 
in the pre-1990 period, the valuation of  REITs is straightforward, and no value 
anomaly would be observed.  
 
8.2 Implications 
This study also contributes to some practical implications in the REIT 
investment.  
First, it provides evidence that adopting a value strategy in the REIT market can 
produce significantly higher returns after 1990. Essentially, the strategy of  buying 
value REIT stocks and simultaneously selling growth REIT stocks each year would 
yield a return of  is 8.5%, 27.9% and 48.7%, for one-, two- and three-year holding 
periods, respectively. The profits are reliable because most of  the superior returns 
come from the buying side of  value REIT stocks, and also the superior performance 
of  value REIT stocks is not due to firm size and leverage. In addition, as the value 
anomaly is stronger in the post-1990 period, when valuation uncertainty is greater, we 
would predict that this value anomaly will continue in the future.  
Second, while value REIT stocks after 1990 yield a higher return than growth 
REIT stocks, they are not exposed to higher systematic risks. The beta and risk 
loading on the HML factor for the value REIT portfolio is only 0.217 and 0.577, 
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respectively. While the beta and risk loading on HML factor for growth REIT 
portfolio is 0.265 and 0.630, respectively. Although value REIT stocks do not expose 
investors to much higher systematic risks, they are associated with higher 
idiosyncratic risk. In particular, the idiosyncratic risk of  value REIT portfolio from 
CAPM and Fama-French’s three-factor model is 0.039 and 0.034, respectively. Whilst 
the growth REIT portfolio has an idiosyncratic risk of  0.030 and 0.025 from CAPM 
and Fama-French’s three-factor model, respectively. Therefore, value strategy in 
REIT market may not be adapted to small investors who are holding poorly 
diversified portfolios. Instead, institutional investors may have more opportunity in 
adopting value strategy in REITs. However, as value strategy involves long-term 
holding perspective, the short-term volatility might be higher than other assets. 
Therefore, intuitional investors still have to be cautious about buying value REIT 
stocks.  
 
8.3 Limitations and Recommendation for Future Studies  
There are some limitations in our study. Firstly, the use of  the COMPUSTAT 
on-line database inevitably causes the survivorship bias. Also there are still a number 
of  marginal REIT stocks not included in our sample, adding these REITs might 
change our results to a certain extent.  
Secondly, our results for the pre-1990 period might be biased because of  the 
small sample size in early 1980s. Although we have examined this problem by using 3 
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portfolios in the pre-1990 period, it is still possible that the results are biased by some 
of  the extreme returns.  
Thirdly, we have not further separated those REIT with the “UPREIT” and 
“DOWNREIT” structures. Ling and Ryngaert (1997) suggest that valuation of  these 
REITs is more difficult, and therefore, mispricing would be stronger in these REITs, 
and the value anomaly might also be due to these REITs. Also, due to the limitation 
of  data source, we have not further examined the market sector of  the value and 
growth REIT stocks. Further studies could examine the relationship between market 
sector and the B/M ratio, which may facilitate the interpretation of  our results. 
Fourthly, we have found some evidence that the leverage of  REITs increase 
significantly during 1990s, when REITs have more growth opportunities. In addition, 
value REITs portfolio shows the most significant increase of  leverage, which would 
be a sign of  a high growth potential in value REITs. Future study can explicitly 
examine the relationship between REIT growth expectation and its financing activity, 
in conjunction with the value anomaly.  
Fifthly, owing to the limitation of  the data source, we did not examine the 
relationship between the value anomaly and the institutional investor’s ownership. It 
is probably that the growth REIT stocks have higher institutional ownership, and that 
the higher involvement of  institutions helps to improve the valuation of  the growth 
REIT. A following study could explicitly examine this relationship.  
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Sixthly, the REIT market provides a good context to examine the relationship 
between the value anomaly and the valuation uncertainty. It is possible to examine 
the value anomaly and the valuation uncertainty in other industries, and to test 





Table a.1 Returns to Value and Growth REIT Portfolios before 1990 (3 Portfolios) 
For each year from 1982 to 1990, REITs stocks are assigned to three portfolios based on the 
value of  B/M, calculated as book equity in fiscal end year t-1 divided by market value of  
equity at the end of  June of  year t. Re1, Re2, and Re3 are the one-year, two-year, and 
three-year buy-and-hold return, respectively, beginning July of  year t. SRe1, SRe2, and SRe3 
are the size-adjusted one-year, two-year, and three-year buy-and-hold return, respectively, 
beginning in July of  year t, defined as raw buy-and-hold return less size-quintile return, where 
size deciles are based on all REIT stocks. Statistical significance is reported for difference in 
the values of  Q1 and Q3 portfolios, Q1-Q3 Diff. The t-statistic is computed as mean divided 
by standard error of  the annual estimates. To correct for serial correlation in returns induced 
by overlapping holding periods for return horizons greater than one year, we use the Newey 
and West (1987) corrected standard error of  the means. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
better than the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 













1982- 1990    
Re1 0.088  0.140  0.168    -0.080 *  
Re2 0.262  0.421  0.389   -0.127  
Re3 0.427  0.680  0.631   -0.204  
SRe1 -0.007  -0.002 0.008   -0.015  
SRe2 -0.023  0.011 0.013    -0.036 * 
SRe3 -0.050  0.035 0.013   -0.063 
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Table a.2 Returns to Value and Growth REIT Portfolios  
(Mortgage and Hybrid REITs Excluded) 
Re1, Re2, and Re3 are the one-year, two-year, and three-year buy-and-hold return, respectively, 
beginning July of  year t. SRe1, SRe2, and SRe3 are the size-adjusted one-year, two-year, and 
three-year buy-and-hold return, respectively, beginning in July of  year t, defined as raw 
buy-and-hold return less size-quintile return, where size deciles are based on all REIT stocks. 
Statistical significance is reported for difference in the values of  Q1 and Q5 portfolios, 
Q1-Q5 Diff. The t-statistic is computed as mean divided by standard error of  the annual 
estimates. To correct for serial correlation in returns induced by overlapping holding periods 
for return horizons greater than one year, we use the Newey and West (1987) corrected 
standard error of  the means. ***, **, and * indicate significance at better than the 1%, 5%, 










1982-1990       
Re1 0.112  0.223 0.136 0.281 0.210  0.192   -0.098 * 
Re2 0.202  0.316 0.361 0.451 0.352  0.336   -0.150 * 
Re3 0.381  0.512 0.514 0.640 0.678  0.545  -0.297  
SRe1 -0.014  0.011 -0.012 0.031 -0.014 -0.002  -0.010  
SRe2 -0.001  -0.024 0.015 0.023 0.007  0.004  -0.008  
SRe3 -0.031  -0.012 0.025 0.012 0.042  0.007  -0.073  
1991-2000       
Re1 0.231 0.146 0.162 0.148 0.151 0.168   0.080 ** 
Re2 0.612 0.325 0.341 0.365 0.378 0.404    0.234 ***
Re3 1.428 0.465 0.55 0.416 0.521 0.676    0.907 ***
SRe1 0.031 0.008 0.012 -0.021 -0.005 0.005    0.036 ***
SRe2 0.041 0.002 -0.029 -0.011 -0.013 -0.002    0.054 ***
SRe3 0.059 -0.021 -0.036 -0.012 -0.024 -0.007    0.083 ***








Table a.2 Returns to Value and Growth REIT Portfolios  
(Using Dividend/Price ratio as the criteria for value and growth portfolios) 
For each year from 1982 to 1990, REITs stocks are assigned to five quintile portfolios based 
on the value of  D/P, calculated as dividend per share in fiscal year t-1 divided by share price 
at the end of  June of  year t. Re1, Re2, and Re3 are the one-year, two-year, and three-year 
buy-and-hold return, respectively, beginning July of  year t. SRe1, SRe2, and SRe3 are the 
size-adjusted one-year, two-year, and three-year buy-and-hold return, respectively, beginning 
in July of  year t, defined as raw buy-and-hold return less size-quintile return, where size 
deciles are based on all REIT stocks. Statistical significance is reported for difference in the 
values of  Q1 and Q5 portfolios, Q1-Q5 Diff. The t-statistic is computed as mean divided by 
standard error of  the annual estimates. To correct for serial correlation in returns induced by 
overlapping holding periods for return horizons greater than one year, we use the Newey and 
West (1987) corrected standard error of  the means. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 










1982-1990       
Re1 0.206  0.169 0.114 0.126 0.196  0.182  0.010  
Re2 0.345  0.265 0.254 0.137 0.367  0.326  -0.022  
Re3 0.531 0.451 0.487 0.398 0.583 0.537  -0.152 
SRe1 0.006 0.004 -0.005 -0.012 0.007  0.000 -0.001  
SRe2 0.007 0.012 -0.025 -0.003 0.009  0.000  -0.002  
SRe3 0.005 -0.002 -0.015 -0.005 0.017  -0.002  -0.012  
1991-2000       
Re1 0.207  0.152 0.181 0.149 0.128  0.172   0.079 ***
Re2 0.452  0.366 0.380 0.319 0.315  0.389   0.137 ***
Re3 0.701  0.544 0.545 0.498 0.471  0.587   0.229 ***
SRe1 0.021 0.014 -0.008 -0.017 -0.010 0.000   0.031 ***
SRe2 0.036 0.019 -0.012 -0.023 -0.019 0.000   0.056 ***
SRe3 0.044 0.021 0.004 -0.032 -0.037 0.000   0.081 ***
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